إتحاد الغرف التجارية الصناعية الزراعية الفلسطينية
Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

Week 60: September 15 – 21, 2025
Week 61: September 22 – 28, 2025

In this Report:

- A total of 1,056 trucks entered the Gaza Strip: 614 during Week 60 and 442 during Week 61.
- 541 trucks (51%) were looted and only 515 (49%) were delivered.
- Humanitarian aid trucks represented (63%), whereas commercial trucks represented (37%).
- Trucks passed through two crossings: Karem Abu Salem (KAS) (82%), and Kissufim (18%).
- Food items dominated truck entries with 897 trucks (85%).
- Consumer basket value fluctuated between 617 and 907 ILS,
- Cash-out commission fluctuated between 37–40%.
- The current mechanism for bringing commercial goods into the Gaza Strip remains unclear and lacks transparency.

September 30, 2025

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

1. Executive Summary:

- This report, covers **Week 60** (September 15 – 21, 2025) **and Week 61** (September 22-28, 2025)**,** a period marked by continued war and a humanitarian crisis on Gaza Strip.
- Between September 15-28, 2025, a total of **1,056 trucks entered Gaza Strip**, of which **541** (51%) were looted and only **515** (49%) were delivered.
- In Week 60 (September 15 – 21, 2025), **614 trucks** arrived (282 looted, 332 delivered), while in Week 61 (September 22-28, 2025) **442 trucks** arrived (219 looted, 223 delivered).
- **Humanitarian** aid trucks accounted for the majority **at 669 trucks (63%)**, whereas **commercial** trucks through the private sector **totalled 387 (37%).**
- Trucks passed through **two crossings, Karem Abu Salem (KAS)** was the **most active** with a total of **871 trucks (82%)**, followed by **Kissufim** with **185 trucks (18%)**, while **West Erez (Zikim)** and **Route 96 Gate** recorded **no movement (0%)**.
- **Food items** accounted for 85% of trucks, with a strong priority for **flour** and **basic food supplies**, while **medical supplies**, **fuel**, and **hygiene items** remain very limited, reflecting the ongoing multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis.
- During week 61, prices of essential food items in Gaza showed **notable decreases** compared to week 60, yet remained **significantly above pre-war levels**, reflecting ongoing market instability.
- During week 61, prices of **non-food items** in Gaza showed notable fluctuations, with **firewood and baby milk rising** slightly due to scarcity, while **soap remained stable** at very high levels.
- From 15–28 September, basket values fluctuated between 617 and 907 ILS, reflecting **market pressures** and improved inflows, yet prices **remain extremely high** compared to pre-war levels, highlighting ongoing economic fragility.
- From 15–28 September, the commission fluctuated narrowly between 37% and 40%, remaining **very high**, which continues to **burden households**.
- The current **mechanism** for bringing commercial goods into the Gaza Strip remains **unclear** and **lacks transparency**, as no **clear criteria** or **timeline** for implementation have been announced, leaving the private sector and markets in a state of **confusion** and **anticipation**.
- The **private sector in Gaza** faces a highly **fragile environment**, grappling with **restricted goods entry**, **liquidity shortages**, **infrastructure destruction**, and **rising costs**, forcing most businesses to operate at minimal survival levels.
- Persistent **security risks**, political uncertainty, and a **weak investment climate** further limit growth and long-term planning.
- Key **recommendations** for Gaza include: increasing **humanitarian aid** and allowing the **private sector** to import essential goods, improving **energy and infrastructure** for storage and transport, supporting **agricultural recovery**, and enhancing **market stability** through e-payments, transparent coordination, and price regulation to mitigate the humanitarian crisis and foster economic recovery.

2. Daily Crossing Points Status:

3.1. Number of Trucks:

Table (1) shows data on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 15/09/2025 to 28/09/2025, broken down by crossing points, with totals for each week.

3.1.1. Overview of the period:

- Total trucks entered: **1,056 trucks**.
- Of these, **541 trucks were looted** (51%) and **515 trucks were delivered** (49%).
- The daily average number of trucks during the period was about **75 trucks**.

3.1.2. Week 60 (September 15-21, 2025):

- Total trucks: **614** (282 looted, 332 delivered).
- Highest entry day: Thursday 18/09/2025 with **132 trucks**.
- Lowest entry day: Monday 15/09/2025 with **28 Trucks**.
- Humanitarian aid accounted for **346 trucks** (56% of total inflows), while commercial goods totalled **268 trucks** (44%).

3.1.3. Week 61 (September 22-28, 2025):

- Total trucks: **442** (219 looted, 183 delivered).
- Highest entry day: Thursday 25/09/2025 with **106 trucks**.
- Lowest entry day: Sunday 28/09/2025 with **40 trucks**.
- Humanitarian aid accounted for **323 trucks** (73% of total inflows), while commercial goods totalled **119 trucks** (27%).

Table (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (September 15-28, 2025).

#	Day	Date	Number of Entered Trucks				
			KAS	West Erez	Route 96	Kissufim	Total
1	Monday	15/09/2025	28	0	0	0	**28**
2	Tuesday	16/09/2025	85	0	0	0	**85**
3	Wednesday	17/09/2025	85	0	0	0	**85**
4	Thursday	18/09/2025	65	0	0	67	**132**
5	Friday	19/09/2025	60	0	0	48	**108**
6	Saturday	20/09/2025	55	0	0	43	**98**
7	Sunday	21/09/2025	78	0	0	0	**78**
Subtotal 1 (Week 60)			**456**	**0**	**0**	**158**	**614**
8	Monday	22/09/2025	63	0	0	0	**63**
9	Tuesday	23/09/2025	47	0	0	0	**47**
10	Wednesday	24/09/2025	41	0	0	0	**41**
11	Thursday	25/09/2025	89	0	0	17	**106**
12	Friday	26/09/2025	49	0	0	10	**59**
13	Saturday	27/09/2025	86	0	0	0	**86**
14	Sunday	28/09/2025	40	0	0	0	**40**
Subtotal 2 (Week 61)			**415**	**0**	**0**	**27**	**442**
Total			**871**	**0**	**0**	**185**	**1,056**



Figure (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (September 15-28, 2025)

3.2. (Humanitarian Vs. Commercial) and (Delivered Vs. Looted) trucks:

Out of a total of 1,056 trucks entering Gaza during Weeks 60 and 61, only **515 trucks** (49%) were successfully delivered, while **541 trucks** (51%) were looted. Humanitarian aid trucks accounted for the majority at **669 trucks** (63%), whereas commercial trucks through the private sector **totalled 387** (37%). Despite their smaller share, commercial trucks showed relatively **better protection** and contributed to **improving the availability of goods in markets**. The high looting rate among humanitarian trucks highlights the deliberate Israeli policy of preventing the securing and protection of humanitarian aid convoys, while enforcing the chaos of so-called "**self-distribution**" of aid — a **euphemism for looting.**

Table (2): Commercial vs. Humanitarian, Delivery and Looting Status (Weeks 60-61).

Date	Number of Trucks			Delivered Status	
	Commercial	Humanitarian	Total	Looted	Delivered
15/09/2025	0	28	**28**	22	6
16/09/2025	40	45	**85**	45	40
17/09/2025	50	35	**85**	45	40
18/09/2025	67	65	**132**	65	67
19/09/2025	48	60	**108**	60	48
20/09/2025	43	55	**98**	15	83
21/09/2025	20	58	**78**	30	48
Subtotal 1 (Week 60)	**268**	**346**	**614**	**282**	**332**
22/09/2025	12	51	**63**	44	19
23/09/2025	15	32	**47**	47	0
24/09/2025	0	41	**41**	36	5
25/09/2025	22	84	**106**	24	82
26/09/2025	20	39	**59**	32	27
27/09/2025	50	36	**86**	36	50
28/09/2025	0	40	**40**	40	0
Subtotal 1 (Week 61)	**119**	**323**	**442**	**219**	**183**
Total (Week 60 + 61)	**387**	**669**	**1,056**	**541**	**515**





Figure (2): Humanitarian Vs. Commercial and Delivered Vs. Looted trucks (Weeks 60-61).

3.3. Types Of Commodities:

During **week 61**, a total of **442 aid trucks** entered **Gaza** compared to **614 trucks** in **week 60**, marking an overall **decrease** of about **28%**. Despite this decline, **flour deliveries** showed a **notable exception**, **doubling** from **104** to **231 trucks**, making it the **primary food component** with a total of **335 trucks** out of **1,056** over the two weeks. In contrast, **food parcels** dropped by **70%** and **general food items** by **65%**, reflecting a serious **shortage in food diversity** despite the increased availability of **flour**. **Fuel deliveries** decreased by **20%** and **shelter materials** by **36%**, further worsening the already **difficult living conditions**. Meanwhile, **medical supplies** and **hygiene items** recorded slight increases (**+50%** and **+40%** respectively), yet they remain far below the actual **needs**. The situation is particularly **alarming** due to the **shortage of fuel** and **medical supplies**, which threatens the ability of **hospitals** and **health facilities** to continue operating and significantly heightens **humanitarian risks** under the current circumstances.

Table (3): Number of Trucks by Commodity Type (Week 60-61)

#	Item	Number of Trucks		
		Week 60 (September 15-21, 2025)	**Week 61** (September 22-28, 2025)	**Total**
1	Flour	104	231	**335**
2	Food Parcels	113	34	**147**
3	Food Items	308	107	**415**
4	Medical Supplies	8	12	**20**
5	Fuel	15	12	**27**
6	Tents and Shelter Material	61	39	**100**
7	Hygiene	5	7	**12**
Total		**614**	**442**	**1,056**



	Flour	Food Parcels	Food Items	Medical Supplies	Fuel	Tents and Shelter Material	Hygiene
Week 60	104	113	308	8	15	61	5
Week 61	231	34	107	12	12	39	7

Week 60 Week 61

Figure (3): Number of Trucks by Type of Commodities (Weeks 60-61).



Figure (4): Commodities by types during the reporting period (weeks 60 -61).

3. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

4.1. Food Items:

During **week 61** (September 15-21, 2025), the **prices of essential food items** in Gaza recorded **notable decreases** compared to **week 60** (September 22-28, 2025), though they remain **significantly higher** than **pre-war levels**. **Vegetable prices** declined at varying rates, with **tomato** down by **2%**, **onion** by **5%**, **potato** by **21%**, **cucumber** by **13%**, and **pepper** by **25%**, in addition to moderate drops in **eggplant** and **lemon**. A **considerable decrease** was also observed in key **imported staples**, including **flour** (-38%), **macaroni** (-

31%), and **sugar** (-16%), which reflect the arrival of **commercial shipments**. Conversely, **kidney beans** rose by **14%** due to the **scarcity** of **legumes**, while **frozen chicken** and **bananas** remained entirely **unavailable** in the markets. The **steepest declines** were recorded in **garlic** (-42%) and **flour**, while **apple** appeared for the first time at a **very high price** (57.5 ILS/kg). Overall, these changes highlight the continued **instability** of the **markets**, with limited improvement in the **availability** of some items alongside a **severe shortage** of **animal proteins** and **fruits**.

Table (4): Weekly Food Price Trends in Gaza: Pre-War vs. Weeks 60 and 61.

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 60		Week 61		% Of change in Week 61 compared to Week 60
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Kidney beans	Kg	7	10.50	50%	12.00	71%	14%
2	Tomato	Kg	2	50.00	2400%	49.17	2358%	-2%
3	Oil	Liter	9	17.00	89%	16.33	81%	-4%
4	Onion	Kg	2	50.00	2400%	47.50	2275%	-5%
5	Eggplant	Kg	2	14.50	625%	13.33	567%	-8%
6	Rice	Kg	8	14.17	77%	12.83	60%	-9%
7	Cucumber	Kg	2	24.83	1142%	21.67	983%	-13%
8	Lemon	Kg	4	70.00	1650%	60.00	1400%	-14%
9	Sugar	Kg	3	14.17	372%	11.83	294%	-16%
10	Potato	Kg	2	28.83	1342%	22.67	1033%	-21%
11	Pepper	Kg	10	108.33	983%	81.67	717%	-25%
12	Macaroni	Kg	2.5	13.00	420%	9.00	260%	-31%
13	Flour	Sack (25Kg)	35	198.00	466%	123.33	252%	-38%
14	Garlic	Kg	10	137.50	1275%	80.00	700%	-42%
15	Apple	Kg	5	N/A	N/A	57.50	1050%	N/A
16	Frozen chicken	Kg	8.00	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
17	Banana	Kg	2.50	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA



Figure (5): Weekly Food Items Price Trends: Pre-War vs. Weeks 60 and 61.

4.2. Non-Food Items:

During **week 61**, the **prices** of **non-food items** and **essential supplies** in Gaza showed clear **fluctuations** compared to **week 60**. **Firewood** increased by **2%** due to greater reliance on it as an **alternative energy source**, while **baby milk** also rose by **2%** amid ongoing **scarcity**. In contrast, **soap** prices remained **stable** at very **high levels**, whereas several items recorded varying **decreases**, most notably **baby diapers** which dropped by **50%** but remain many times higher than **pre-war levels**, along with **laundry detergent** (-25%), **diesel** (-20%), **dishwashing liquid** (-5%), and **sanitary towels** (-4%). Despite these **declines**, **prices** remain far **above** their **normal levels**, reflecting a continued **severe shortage** of **essential supplies** with only **limited improvement** in overall **availability**.

Table (5): Weekly Non-Food Price Trends: Pre-War vs. Weeks 60 and 61.

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 60		Week 61		% Of change in Week 59 compared to Week 58
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	firewood	Kg	0.5	7.86	1471%	8.00	1500%	**2%**
2	Baby Milk	Can (400 gm)	25	45.00	80%	45.71	83%	**2%**
3	Soap	Piece	2.5	10.00	300%	10.00	300%	**0%**
4	sanitary towels	Pack (10 pcs)	6	9.71	62%	9.29	55%	**-4%**
5	Dishwashing liquid	Liter	6	53.57	793%	50.71	745%	**-5%**
6	Diesel	Liter	6	100.00	1567%	80.00	1233%	**-20%**
7	laundry detergent	Kg	8	80.00	900%	60.00	650%	**-25%**
8	Baby diapers	Pack (40 pcs)	29	341.43	1077%	170.00	486%	**-50%**



Figure (6): Weekly Non-Food Price Trends: Pre-War vs. Weeks 60 and 61.

4. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

5.1. GCPI – Long Term Trend

Comparing August and September 2025 shows the following:

- **Average basket value:**
  - August: 1,344 ILS.
  - September (up to 28): about 909 ILS.
  - This represents a decline of around **32%** within one month.
- **Index value:**
  - August: **1,454%**.
  - September: **983%**.
  - A clear decrease of about **-471 percentage points**.
- **Conclusion:**
  This trend suggests a **relative easing** of market prices compared to the peak levels observed between **May** and **July** 2025, although values **remain far above pre-war benchmarks**, highlighting the continued fragility and volatility of the market.

Table (6): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to September 2025

Month	Basket value (ILS)			index value (%)		
	North	South	unified price	North	South	unified price
Nov-24	1,987.06	782.00	-	2,150%	846%	-
Dec-24	1,251.87	837.60	-	1,354%	906%	-
Jan-25	584.32	395.76	-	632%	428%	-
Feb-25	156.59	156.59	156.59	169%	169%	169%
Mar-25	-	-	385.03	-	-	417%
Apr-25	-	-	775.88	-	-	839%
May-25	-	-	1,857.71	-	-	2,010%
Jun-25	-	-	2,611.37	-	-	2,825%
July-25	-	-	2,766.49	-	-	2,993%
Aug-25	-	-	1,344.21	-	-	1454%
Sep-2025	-	-	908.76	-	-	983%

5.2. GCPI – Short Term Fluctuation

Between **15 and 28 September 2025**, consumer basket data showed notable **fluctuations**, with **basket values** ranging between **617 and 907 ILS**, while the **price index** ranged between **667% and 981%**. At the beginning of the period (**15–19 September**), basket values averaged between 751 and 907 ILS, with the index peaking at **981% on 17 September**, the highest level during this timeframe. This was followed by a phase of relative **stability** between **20 and 23 September**, averaging around **824 ILS**, before a sharp **decline** occurred in the final days (**24–28 September**), when basket values dropped below **650 ILS** on most days and the index hit its **lowest point of 667% on 27 September**. This steep decline in the last days reflects clear **market pressures** and an improvement in the **inflow of goods** and shifts in **supply and demand**. Despite the relative decrease, **price levels remain extremely high** compared to pre-war levels, highlighting the continued **fragility** of the economic and living conditions for households.

Table (7): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (September 15-28, 2025).

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)	index value (%)
1	15/09/2025	750.81	812%
2	16/09/2025	780.13	844%
3	17/09/2025	907.18	981%
4	18/09/2025	825.37	893%
5	19/09/2025	775.84	839%
6	20/09/2025	799.67	865%
7	21/09/2025	749.74	811%
8	22/09/2025	845.64	915%
9	23/09/2025	897.64	971%
10	24/09/2025	645.42	698%
11	25/09/2025	639.15	691%
12	26/09/2025	660.65	715%
13	27/09/2025	616.59	667%
14	28/09/2025	633.43	685%



Figure (7): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (15–28 Sep 2025).

5. Cash-out commission:

6.1. Long-term trend:

The following table shows the evolution of **cash-out commission** between January and September 2025. The data indicates that **August** marked the beginning of a downward trend after the rate had remained fixed at record levels (**42%**) in June and July. The improvement continued in **September**, with a further decline.

- **Comparison between August and September 2025:**
  - **August 2025:** Commission stood at **38%**.
  - **September 2025 (up to September 28):** Dropped to **36%**.
  - This represents a decrease of **2 percentage points**, equivalent to a relative decline of **5%**.

Table (8): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – Aug 2025).

Month	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	July-25	Aug-25	Sep-25
cash out commission (%)	17%	18%	27%	30%	32%	42%	42%	38%	36%



Figure (8): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – September 2025).

6.2. Short-term fluctuation:

During the period between **15 and 28 September 2025**, **cash out commission** data showed **relative stability** within a narrow range of **37% to 40%**. The **commission** started at a **high level** of **40%** in the early days, before recording a slight **decline** to **37%** in the middle of the period (**19 and 26 September**). Some minor **fluctuations** were also observed around **38% and 39%**, reflecting limited **volatility** associated with the level of **cash withdrawal demand**. Despite these changes, the **commission** remained at **very high levels**, increasing the **financial burden** on **households** amid difficult **economic conditions**. The **relative stability** of the **cash out commission** indicates that the **cash market** shows no real **relief**, remaining under **high-pressure levels**.

Table (9): Daily cash out commission (September 15-28, 2025).

#	Date	cash out commission (%)
1	15/09/2025	40%
2	16/09/2025	40%
3	17/09/2025	38%
4	18/09/2025	38%
5	19/09/2025	37%
6	20/09/2025	39%
7	21/09/2025	38%
8	22/09/2025	40%
9	23/09/2025	40%
10	24/09/2025	39%
11	25/09/2025	38%
12	26/09/2025	37%
13	27/09/2025	39%
14	28/09/2025	38%



Figure (9): Daily cash out commission (September 15-28, 2025).

6. Coordination Mechanism:

Weeks **60 and 61 (15–28 September 2025)** continued under the same mechanism, allowing the entry of both humanitarian aid and commercial goods into Gaza. The entry of commercial goods followed the Israeli announcement on **5 August 2025**, which permits a limited number of local traders (one to three traders only) to bring in goods based on unspecified criteria and security checks. No details were provided regarding the exact mechanism or criteria. According to the Israeli statement, the goods included **basic food items, baby diapers, fruits and vegetables, and hygiene products**. However, most of the current inflows, whether humanitarian or commercial, remain largely restricted to some items of food supplies, with **tight restrictions** still in place on all other types of goods. The phenomenon of **truck looting** upon entry into Gaza also remains widespread, particularly affecting humanitarian aid trucks. This looting has been facilitated by the Israeli side through the imposition of **fixed schedules and designated routes**, which made the trucks more vulnerable to looting, unlike commercial trucks that usually reach their destinations. These incidents have been euphemistically referred to as **“self-distribution of aid”**, essentially a softened term for looting. As a result, this mechanism has **completely failed to improve food security**.

7. Difficulties:

The private sector in Gaza is currently operating in a highly fragile environment. On one hand, it faces commercial and financial strangulation due to restrictions on crossings and liquidity shortages. On the other hand, it suffers from infrastructure destruction and declining demand. As a result, most economic activities have shifted toward survival at a minimum level rather than growth or development. Below are the main challenges facing the economic sectors in Gaza:

8.1. Restrictions on Goods Entry

- Closure of crossings or allowing only very limited items and quantities that do not meet market needs.
- Focus on some food and relief items, while raw materials and operational/production inputs are banned.
- Heavy reliance on aid instead of normal trade.

8.2. Financial and Liquidity Crisis

- Extremely weak consumer purchasing power due to halted incomes and loss of livelihoods.
- Severe shortage of cash in circulation, with cash-out commissions reaching unprecedented levels (30–50%), thus further weakening purchase power.

8.3. Destruction and Operational Constraints

- Widespread destruction of infrastructure (factories, workshops, shops, warehouses).
- Power outages, fuel shortages, and communication cuts hindering production and distribution.
- Lack of raw materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance and operations.

8.4. Rising Operating Costs and Prices

- Abnormal spikes in the prices of essential goods and fuel.
- Weakened competitiveness due to rising costs alongside declining demand.

8.5. Security Risks and Instability

- Ongoing threats of military operations and evacuation orders.
- Difficulties in the movement of people and goods between governorates.
- Inability to plan long-term due to political and security uncertainty.

8.6. Weak Investment Environment

- Absence of incentives or investment protection measures.
- Reluctance of local and international investors to inject new capital.
- Dependence of the private sector on small-scale, basic activities merely to survive.

8. Recommendations:

1. **Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies**
    a. **Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
    b. **Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
    c. **Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.
2. **Energy and Infrastructure**
    a. **Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
    b. **Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities**, including **storage and cold storage units**, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
    c. **Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks** to access **all crossings and routes**, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
    d. **Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.
3. **Agricultural Recovery**
    a. **Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs**—seeds, tools, fertilizers, animal fodder—to support small farmers and **reduce dependence on external supplies**.
    b. **Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations** (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in **trade, industry, and agriculture**.
4. **Market Stability and Financial Access**
    a. **Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems** among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring **power and internet** access.
    b. **Find effective, transparent mechanisms** to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper **prioritization and distribution**.
    c. **Introduce market control measures** to **prevent monopolies**, regulate **pricing**, and **reduce inflation**, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the **worsening humanitarian crisis**, stabilizing **economic conditions**, and supporting **long-term recovery** in Gaza.

9. Conclusion

During the period from **September 15 to 28, 2025**, the **Gaza Strip** continued to face the **impacts of war** and a **severe humanitarian crisis**, with **1,056 trucks** entering, of which **541 trucks were looted (51%)** and **515 trucks were successfully delivered (49%)**. **Humanitarian trucks** made up the majority (**63%**) compared to **37% for commercial trucks**, with widespread **looting of humanitarian shipments**, while **commercial trucks received relatively better protection**. During these two weeks, the **number of trucks decreased** compared to previous periods, with a **notable increase in flour shipments**, whereas other **food items, fuel, and shelter materials** declined sharply. **Prices of essential food items** showed slight decreases but remained at **extremely high levels**, while **non-food items and essential supplies**, especially **energy and baby products**, stayed extremely expensive. The **consumer basket value** was around **909 ILS**, a **32% decrease compared to August**, yet still approximately **ten times higher than pre-war levels**. The **cash-out commission** stood at **36–37%**, adding a **financial burden on households**. The **private sector and markets** face severe challenges, including **restrictions on goods entry, liquidity shortages, infrastructure destruction, rising costs, and a weak investment environment**, forcing most economic activity to operate at a **minimum survival level**. The report emphasizes the urgent need to **increase humanitarian aid, allow the private sector to import essential goods and production material, improve energy and infrastructure, support agricultural recovery, and enhance market stability** through **electronic payment systems, transparent coordination of goods, and price regulation** to mitigate the **humanitarian crisis** and support **long-term economic recovery in Gaza**.