

Gaza Movement of Goods Weekly Report

Week 55: 12-18 Aug, 2025

According to reports from the Palestinian Ministry of Health on Monday, August 25, the total number of famine death cases **reached 300**, including **117 children**. Regarding aid-related incidents, **2,123 people have been killed** and over **15,615 injured**. This happened either at aid distribution points run by the GHF under Israeli army supervision, or among people waiting for aid trucks near the border crossings in north and south of Gaza Strip.

In this Report:

- 981 trucks entered Gaza during this week, 57% were looted, and 43% were delivered successfully.
- Humanitarian trucks made up the vast majority of the shipments (69%), while only 31% of trucks carried commercial goods.
- Kissufim and West Erez crossings saw the highest activity with 357 and 354 trucks, respectively, while Karem Abu Salem (KAS) handled 270 trucks.
- Trucks cargo was heavily skewed toward Food (952 trucks) include (combined food items, food parcel and flour) and representing 97% of the total.
- The prices of basic goods (food and non-food) showed significant fluctuations compared to the previous week.
- Despite the weekly changes, all prices remain extremely high compared to the pre-war period.
- After reaching a historic peak in July 2025, August witnessed the first sharp downturn in (GCPI), which fell from 2,993% to 1,558%.
- The cash-out commission fluctuated sharply, rising to 52% on 7 August, dropping to 35% on 9 August, and then stabilizing between 28% and 37%.

Gaza Movement of Goods Weekly Report


1. Executive Summary:

- This report, of weekly market analysis in Gaza Strip, covers week 55 (August 12 18, 2025), a period marked by continued war on Gaza and a deepening humanitarian crisis.
- **981 trucks** entered Gaza during the reporting week, **57% (556 trucks)** were looted before reaching their destinations. Only **425 trucks were delivered successfully**.
- **Humanitarian trucks** made up the vast majority of the shipments (**676 trucks**), while only 305 trucks carried commercial goods.
- Kissufim and Erez crossings recorded the highest activity, with 357 and 354 trucks entering respectively, during the week, while Karem Abu Salem (KAS) crossing saw the entry of 270 trucks.
- This week's trucks cargo was heavily skewed toward **Combined Food Items** (504 trucks, ~51%) and **Food parcel** (295 trucks, ~30%), with limited provision of **Flour** (153 trucks, ~16%), **medical supplies** (17 trucks, ~2%), and critically low **fuel** shipments (12 trucks, <1%).
- Aid and trade goods have focused largely on direct consumption, particularly food parcels, flour and staple foods, highlighting a purely humanitarian relief approach, with little effort made to promote self-reliance or support vital economic sectors.
- The prices of food items showed significant fluctuations compared to the previous week. Several vegetables recorded notable increases, such as tomato (+40%), pepper (+41%), onion (+16%), and lemon (+17%).
- In contrast, the prices of most other items declined, led by kidney beans (-79%), sugar (-71%), rice (-50%), vegetable oil and macaroni (-37% each), and flour (-30%).
- non-food items showed notable fluctuations compared to the previous week. Prices of soap (-55%), sanitary towels (-39%), and baby diapers (-29%) decreased, while firewood remained stable and laundry detergent increased sharply (+120%).
- Despite these weekly changes, all prices remain extremely high compared to the prewar period.
- After reaching a historic peak in July 2025, August witnessed the first sharp downturn in (GCPI), which fell from 2,993% to 1,558%.
- During the period, the cash-out commission rate experienced significant fluctuations, rising from 50% to 52% on 7 August, then sharply dropping to 35% on 9 August, before stabilizing relatively between 28% and 37% for the remainder of the period. The sudden decline after 7 August indicates an improvement in the entry of commercial goods into the Gaza Strip and the return of some points of sale to accept electronic payment methods.

2. Distribution of the Population in the Gaza Strip:

The reporting period from Aug 12-18, 2025, witnessed the continued Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe affecting **nearly 2 million people**. By early July, more than 82% of the territory had been designated either as evacuation zones or No-go areas, leaving residents with extremely limited shelter options. Makeshift camps in western Gaza, Deir al-Balah, and Al-Mawasi have exceeded their capacity, lacking basic infrastructure, protection, and sanitation services. In addition, on Thursday, August 7, 2025, the Israeli Cabinet approved the expansion of the military operation to include the occupation of what remains of Gaza City and the middle governorate, after more than one million residents living in the northern Gaza Strip are forcibly displaced to the south. This further exacerbates the already dire humanitarian situation, especially since in the southern Gaza Strip, the only areas where people are allowed to be present are the middle governorate, which is also under threat, and Al-Mawasi. The systematic and accelerated demolition of homes and all types of buildings also continued unabated, and it is no longer confined to Rafah Governorate as before. It has now expanded to all areas under Israeli military control, such as northern Gaza (Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, Jabalia), eastern Gaza Governorate (Shuja'iyya, Zeitoun, Tuffah), and eastern and central Khan Younis Governorate (Abasan, Bani Suheila, Abasan, Hayy Al-Amal, Al-Satar Al-Gharbi, and Ma'an).

Figure (1): Populated and Evacuated Areas, and the Status of Crossings and Roads in Gaza Strip.



3. Daily Crossing Points Status:

3.1. Number of Trucks:

Table (1) shows data on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 12/08/2025 to 18/08/2025, broken down by crossing points and the number of looted or delivered trucks, with totals for each week.

| Table (1): Number | of Trucks Entering | ı Gaza by Crossine | a Point (| (12–18 August 2025). |
|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------|------------------------|
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| # | Day | Date | | Number | of Entered | Trucks | |
|---|-----------|------------|-----|-----------|------------|----------|-------|
| # | Дау | Date | KAS | West Erez | Route 96 | Kissufim | Total |
| 1 | Tuesday | 12/08/2025 | 20 | 50 | 0 | 69 | 139 |
| 2 | Wednesday | 13/08/2025 | 30 | 84 | 0 | 78 | 192 |
| 3 | Thursday | 14/08/2025 | 45 | 45 | 0 | 30 | 120 |
| 4 | Friday | 15/08/2025 | 50 | 50 | 0 | 30 | 130 |
| 5 | Saturday | 16/08/2025 | 50 | 40 | 0 | 30 | 120 |
| 6 | Sunday | 17/08/2025 | 30 | 45 | 0 | 60 | 135 |
| 7 | Monday | 18/08/2025 | 45 | 40 | 0 | 60 | 145 |
| | Tota | | 270 | 354 | 0 | 357 | 981 |





Figure (2): Share of Each Crossing from the Total Number of Entering Trucks (12–18 August 2025).

3.2. (Humanitarian Vs. Commercial) and (Delivered Vs. Looted) trucks:

During the reporting period, the total number of trucks that entered was 981, including 676 carrying humanitarian aid and 305 carrying commercial goods. This shows that humanitarian aid accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total trucks (69%), reflecting the continued heavy reliance on humanitarian supplies to meet the population's needs. In contrast, commercial goods represented only one-third of the trucks (31%), indicating limited commercial activity and weak flow of goods through the private sector. This outcome highlights the dominance of relief operations in truck movements into Gaza, while the commercial role remains restricted. Out of the total trucks that entered during the reporting period, 556 trucks were looted (approximately 57%), while only 425 trucks (43%) were successfully delivered. This indicates that more than half of the trucks did not reach their destination, reflecting a serious challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population and highlighting the limited quantities actually available for distribution due to weak protection and oversight mechanisms for aid convoys. It is worth noting that all the trucks looted during the reporting period were humanitarian aid trucks, with the exception of four commercial trucks—three on 14/08/2025 and one on 17/08/2025.






Figure (3): Commercial Vs. Humanitarian trucks and Delivered Vs. Looted trucks.

3.2. Types Of Commodities:

During the reporting period, a total of 981 trucks entered, with food items of various types (general food items, food parcels, and flour) accounting for the largest share at 952 trucks, representing approximately 97% of the total. In contrast, medical supplies and fuel shipments combined did not exceed 29 trucks (3%), while no hygiene materials were allowed in. These figures indicate that the flow of trucks was almost entirely food-oriented, with an almost complete absence of other vital sectors such as health, fuel, and hygiene, thereby deepening reliance on food aid and leaving critical humanitarian gaps in other essential areas.

Table (2): Number of Trucks Entering Gaza by Type of Goods (12–18 August 2025).

| | | | N | umber of Truc | ks | | |
|------------|---------------|-----------------|-------|---------------------|------|----------------------|-------|
| Date | Food Items | Food Parcels | Flour | Medical Supplies | Fuel | Hygiene Materials | Total |
| 12/08/2025 | 83 | 40 | 10 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 139 |
| 13/08/2025 | 101 | 65 | 20 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 192 |
| 14/08/2025 | 65 | 45 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| 15/08/2025 | 45 | 45 | 23 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 130 |
| 16/08/2025 | 42 | 40 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 |
| 17/08/2025 | 88 | 25 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 135 |
| 18/08/2025 | 80 | 35 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 145 |
| Total | 504 | 295 | 153 | 17 | 12 | 0 | 981 |




Figure (4): Number of Trucks Entering Gaza by Type of Goods (12–18 August 2025).

4. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

The decision to allow the entry of commercial goods into Gaza as of August 5, 2025, marked a turning point in the price levels of essential commodities, particularly food items, despite the lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms through which these goods are being brought in, as well as the transparency and alignment of those mechanisms with recognized commercial practices.

This section provides a systematic analysis of market price trends during the reporting period. It compares current prices with pre-war benchmarks, and with figures from the previous week. P a g e 6 | 17

By contrasting short-term fluctuations with longer-term trajectories, the analysis highlights emerging patterns in affordability and access, both of which are critical indicators for operational planning and advocacy.

4.1. Food Items:

During the reporting period, the prices of essential commodities showed significant fluctuations compared to the previous week. Several vegetables recorded notable increases, such as tomato (+40%), pepper (+41%), onion (+16%), and lemon (+17%). In contrast, the prices of most other items declined, led by kidney beans (-79%), sugar (-71%), rice (-50%), oil and macaroni (-37% each), in addition to decreases in flour (-30%) and several other vegetables. Despite this relative decline, prices remain extremely high compared to the prewar period, with tomato still 5,400% higher and onion 3,472% higher than their pre-war levels. This reflects the continued severe distortions in the market.

Table (3): Prices of Basic Commodities in Gaza – Pre-War, Previous Week, and Current Week.

| | | | Р | Price Average | | Comparison | |
|----|----------------|-------------|---------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| # | Item | Unit | Pre-war | Previous Week | Current Week | with Previous Week | with the Pre-War |
| 1 | Tomato | Kg | 2 | 78.57 | 110 | 40% | 5400% |
| 2 | Onion | Kg | 2 | 61.43 | 71.43 | 16% | 3472% |
| 3 | Lemon | Kg | 4 | 68.57 | 80 | 17% | 1900% |
| 4 | Cucumber | Kg | 2 | 40.86 | 27.14 | -34% | 1257% |
| 5 | Potato | Kg | 2 | 33.14 | 23.86 | -28% | 1093% |
| 6 | Pepper | Kg | 10 | 80.86 | 114.29 | 41% | 1043% |
| 7 | Flour | Sack (25Kg) | 35 | 492.86 | 342.86 | -30% | 880% |
| 8 | Eggplant | Kg | 2 | 23.57 | 16.71 | -29% | 736% |
| 9 | Sugar | Kg | 3 | 83.43 | 24 | -71% | 700% |
| 10 | Macaroni | Kg | 2.5 | 26 | 16.29 | -37% | 552% |
| 11 | Oil | Liter | 9 | 36.86 | 23.14 | -37% | 157% |
| 12 | Rice | Kg | 8 | 39.71 | 20 | -50% | 150% |
| 13 | Kidney beans | Kg | 7 | 45.71 | 9.71 | -79% | 39% |
| 14 | Frozen chicken | Kg | 8 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 15 | Garlic | Kg | 2.5 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 16 | Apple | Kg | 5 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 17 | Banana | Kg | 2.5 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 18 | Orange | Kg | 4 | NA | NA | NA | NA |




Figure (5): Prices of Basic Commodities in Gaza – Pre-War, Previous Week, and Current Week

4.2. Non-Food Items:

During the reporting period, prices of non-food items showed notable fluctuations compared to the previous week. Prices of soap (-55%), sanitary towels (-39%), and baby diapers (-29%) decreased, while firewood remained stable and laundry detergent increased sharply (+120%). Despite these weekly changes, all prices remain extremely high compared to the pre-war period, with soap up by 1,586%, firewood by 1,300%, and laundry detergent by 1,079%, reflecting the continued major market distortions and their impact on household purchasing power and access to basic hygiene needs.

Table (4): Prices of Non-Food Items in Gaza – Pre-War, Previous Week, and Current Week.

| | | | Р | rice Averaç | Comparison | | |
|---|--------------------|---------------|---------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| # | Item | Unit | Pre-war | Previous Week | Current Week | with Previous Week | with the Pre-War |
| 1 | Soap | Piece | 2.5 | 94.29 | 42.14 | -55% | 1586% |
| 2 | firewood | Kg | 0.5 | 7 | 7 | 0% | 1300% |
| 3 | laundry detergent | Kg | 8 | 42.86 | 94.29 | 120% | 1079% |
| 4 | Dishwashing liquid | Liter | 6 | 55 | 52.14 | -5% | 769% |
| 5 | Baby diapers | Pack (40 pcs) | 29 | 170 | 120 | -29% | 314% |
| 6 | sanitary towels | Pack (10 pcs) | 6 | 14.71 | 9 | -39% | 50% |




Figure (6): Prices of Non-Food Items in Gaza – Pre-War, Previous Week, and Current Week.

5. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

Since November 2024, Gaza's economic situation has been closely monitored amid the ongoing war and severe restrictions on the entry of goods and aid. At times, these restrictions escalated into a full blockade, causing significant disruptions to market conditions. To systematically track price fluctuations in essential commodities, the Gaza Chamber of Commerce established an index covering 12 key food and non-food items commonly purchased by households.

The index is structured to ensure reliability based on two key criteria:

- **It includes basic consumer goods** that the majority of households purchase, rather than items catering to a specific segment.
- It focuses on consistently available products throughout the data collection period across northern and southern Gaza.

To determine the quantity of each commodity in the index, two primary data sources were utilized:

- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reports, which provided household demographics and monthly per capita consumption rates.
- A survey of 125 household heads, which helped refine sub-categories within vegetables and hygiene products that were not explicitly detailed in PCBS reports.

These data points were used to calculate the **weekly consumption rate for a household of 5.5 members**, forming the basis for price comparisons in the following table:

Note: This basket represents the average weekly consumption of a family consisting of **5.5 members** from the 12 food items included in the index calculation. It does **not** reflect the family **total weekly consumption**, and therefore does **not represent the full needs** of the family.

Table (5): Basic consumer goods included in the Basket and their quantities.

| # | Item | Unit | Quantity | Relative Importance Index |
|----|--------------------|-------------------|----------|---------------------------|
| 1 | Flour | Kg | 12.65 | %38 |
| 2 | Tomato | Kg | 3.50 | %10.50 |
| 3 | Onion | Kg | 3.50 | %10.50 |
| 4 | Cucumber | Kg | 3.45 | %10.30 |
| 5 | Potato | Kg | 2.50 | %7.50 |
| 6 | Rice | Kg | 1.38 | %4.14 |
| 7 | Oil | Liter | 1.37 | %4.11 |
| 8 | Sugar | Kg | 1.00 | %3 |
| 9 | Soap | Piece | 1.00 | %3 |
| 10 | Sanitary towels | Packet (12 Piece) | 1.00 | %3 |
| 11 | Washing liquid | Liter | 1.00 | %3 |
| 12 | Dishwashing liquid | Liter | 1.00 | %3 |

An analysis of the Relative Importance Index (RII) reveals the following distribution of household consumption priorities:

- Flour emerges as the most critical item, accounting for 38% of the total index—underscoring its central role in daily food intake.
- Vegetables—notably tomatoes, onions, cucumbers, and potatoes—rank next in importance, with RII values ranging from 7.5% to 10.5%.
- All remaining items fall within a narrower range of 3% to 4%, indicating more limited but still relevant contributions to household consumption.

These findings highlight the foundational role of flour in food security, while also emphasizing the significant dietary dependence on key vegetables in the average household meal.

GCPI – Long Term Trend

The chart below illustrates the monthly value of the food basket, which includes all the items included in the index, and in the quantities specified in the previous table. The following key observations can be drawn from the figure:

- The actual value of the food basket **prior to the war** was **92.44 shekels**, which serves as the **baseline for the index (100%)**.
- During the first three months (from early November 2024 to the end of January 2025), there were significant price disparities between the northern and southern areas of the Gaza Strip, which necessitated calculating the index separately for each region. However, overall, the index showed a clear downward trend in both areas during this period, reaching its lowest point at 164% in the third week of February 2025. This decline coincided with the midpoint of the ceasefire that began on January 19, 2025, a period that witnessed a noticeable improvement in the flow of goods into Gaza. At that time, prices between the north and south converged significantly, eliminating major regional differences, and from that point onward, the index has been calculated as a unified value.

- Since the last week of February 2025, the index began to follow an upward trend, which intensified on March 2, 2025—the day the Israeli side announced a complete closure and halted the entry of all aid, goods, and supplies into the Gaza Strip
- Despite the resumption of aid deliveries on May 20, 2025, the index continued to rise sharply, recording accelerated increases and eventually reaching its peak value of in Jule 2025.
- After reaching a historic peak in July 2025, August witnessed the first sharp downturn.
 Between July and August 2025, the basic goods basket experienced a significant
 decline, with its value dropping from 2,766 ILS to 1,440 ILS, representing a decrease
 of approximately 48%. The price index also fell from 2,993% to 1,558%. Despite this
 relative improvement, prices remain extremely high, reflecting the continued severe
 economic pressures on households in the Gaza Strip.

Table (6): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to July 2025

| Month | Basket value (ILS) | | index value (%) | | | |
|---------|--------------------|--------|-----------------|--------|-------|---------------|
| MOIILII | North | South | unified price | North | South | unified price |
| Nov-24 | 1,987.06 | 782.00 | - | 2,150% | 846% | - |
| Dec-24 | 1,251.87 | 837.60 | - | 1,354% | 906% | - |
| Jan-25 | 584.32 | 395.76 | - | 632% | 428% | - |
| Feb-25 | 156.59 | 156.59 | 156.59 | 169% | 169% | 169% |
| Mar-25 | - | - | 385.03 | - | - | 417% |
| Apr-25 | - | - | 775.88 | - | - | 839% |
| May-25 | - | - | 1,857.71 | - | - | 2,010% |
| Jun-25 | - | - | 2,611.37 | - | - | 2,825% |
| July-25 | - | - | 2,766.49 | - | - | 2,993% |
| Aug-25 | - | - | 1,440.42 | = | - | 1,558% |




Figure (7): Consumer Basket Value from November 2024 to August 2025

5.2. GCPI - Short Term Fluctuation

The following table shows the value of the consumer goods basket and its associated price index over a 14-day period (current and previous week) from 5 to 18 August 2025. The value of the consumer basket experienced a significant decline, falling from 1,856 ILS on 5 August to 1,130 ILS on 17 August, a decrease of approximately 33% during the first few days, before fluctuating daily between 1,100 and 1,389 ILS for the remainder of the period. This was accompanied by a decline in the price index from 2,008% at the beginning of the month to 1,222%, with daily fluctuations reflecting the ongoing market instability. Despite this temporary improvement, prices remain extremely high compared to the pre-war period, highlighting the continued severe economic pressures on households in the Gaza Strip and their direct impact on the purchasing power for essential goods.

| Table (7): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (August 05-18,2025) |
|---|
|---|

| | ()) - 3 - | | , , , |
|----|-------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| # | Date | Basket value (ILS) | index value (%) |
| 1 | 05/08/2025 | 1,856.45 | 2008% |
| 2 | 06/08/2025 | 1,624.95 | 1758% |
| 3 | 07/08/2025 | 1,240.85 | 1342% |
| 4 | 08/08/2025 | 1,333.95 | 1443% |
| 5 | 09/08/2025 | 1,190.22 | 1288% |
| 6 | 10/08/2025 | 1,150.81 | 1245% |
| 7 | 11/08/2025 | 1,106.01 | 1196% |
| 8 | 12/08/2025 | 1,303.61 | 1410% |
| 9 | 13/08/2025 | 1,389.75 | 1503% |
| 10 | 14/08/2025 | 1,251.86 | 1354% |
| 11 | 15/08/2025 | 1,243.35 | 1345% |
| 12 | 16/08/2025 | 1,186.45 | 1283% |
| 13 | 17/08/2025 | 1,129.98 | 1222% |
| 14 | 18/08/2025 | 1,151.96 | 1246% |




Figure (8): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and (August 05-18, 2025).

6. Cash-out commission:

6.1. Long-term trend:

Between July and August 2025, the cash-out commission remained very high and nearly stable at around 41–42%. This stability at such a high level reflects the continued financial pressures on the population in the Gaza Strip, increasing the difficulty of daily cash transactions and adding further burdens on households amid the challenging economic conditions.

Table (8): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – July 2025).

| Month | Jan-25 | Feb-25 | Mar-25 | Apr-25 | May-25 | Jun-25 | July-25 | Aug-25 |
|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| cash out commission (%) | 17% | 18% | 27% | 30% | 32% | 42% | 42% | 41% |




Figure (9): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – Aug 2025).

6.2. Short-term fluctuation:

During the period from 5 to 18 August 2025, the cash-out commission rate experienced significant fluctuations, rising in the first few days from 50% on 5 August to 52% on 7 August, then sharply dropping to 35% on 9 August, before stabilizing relatively between 28% and 37% for the remainder of the period. The sudden decline after 7 August indicates an improvement in the entry of commercial goods into the Gaza Strip and the return of some points of sale to accept electronic payment methods. This fluctuation reflects the ongoing instability of cash liquidity in Gaza and its direct impact on household purchasing power, increasing the difficulty of daily cash transactions and adding financial burdens on residents amid the challenging economic conditions.

Table (9): Daily cash out commission (August 05-18, 2025).

| # | Date | cash out commission (%) |
|----|------------|-------------------------|
| 1 | 05/08/2025 | 50% |
| 2 | 06/08/2025 | 51% |
| 3 | 07/08/2025 | 52% |
| 4 | 08/08/2025 | 48% |
| 5 | 09/08/2025 | 35% |
| 6 | 10/08/2025 | 28% |
| 7 | 11/08/2025 | 32% |
| 8 | 12/08/2025 | 34% |
| 9 | 13/08/2025 | 32% |
| 10 | 14/08/2025 | 36% |
| 11 | 15/08/2025 | 35% |
| 12 | 16/08/2025 | 37% |
| 13 | 17/08/2025 | 32% |
| 14 | 18/08/2025 | 37% |



Figure (10): Daily cash out commission (August 05-18, 2025).

7. Coordination Mechanism:

Week 55 (12–18 August 2025) continued under the same vague mechanism, allowing both humanitarian aid and commercial goods to enter Gaza. The entry of commercial goods followed the procedure announced by the Israeli side on 5 August 2025, permitting couple of local traders to bring in limited goods based on unspecified criteria and security checks. No details were provided regarding the exact mechanism or criteria. According to the Israeli statement, the goods included basic food items, baby food, fruits and vegetables, and hygiene products. During this week, approximately 305 trucks carrying commercial goods entered Gaza. This contributed to an increased availability of food in the markets and a noticeable decline in prices. The declined prices are still more than ten times higher than its normal price.

However, overall truck flows remained low: despite some improvement due to intense international pressure on the Israeli side, Week 55 recorded the entry of 981 trucks, with a daily average of about 140 trucks, representing roughly 25% of the normal pre-war flow. Furthermore, tracking truck flows since the resumption of aid entry on 17 May 2025 shows that the daily average until the end of Week 55 does not exceed 51 trucks, representing only about 9% of the normal level required to meet the population's needs.

In addition, more than 57% of the total trucks were looted on the roads immediately after entering Gaza. This was facilitated by the Israeli side imposing fixed schedules and designated routes for truck movements, particularly humanitarian aid trucks, making them vulnerable to looting, unlike commercial trucks, which usually reach their destinations. These incidents have been referred to as "self-distribution of aid" without deliveries reaching warehouses. Nevertheless, this mechanism has completely failed to improve food security or ensure aid reaches those in need. It has also resulted in the deaths of hundreds and injuries to thousands.

8. Difficulties:

The private sector in Gaza is currently operating in a highly fragile environment. On one hand, it faces commercial and financial strangulation due to restrictions on crossings and liquidity shortages. On the other hand, it suffers from infrastructure destruction and declining demand. As a result, most economic activities have shifted toward survival at a minimum level rather than growth or development. Below are the main challenges facing the economic sectors in Gaza:

8.1. Restrictions on Goods Entry

- Closure of crossings or allowing only very limited quantities that do not meet market needs.
- Focus on food and relief items, while most raw materials and operational/production inputs are banned.
- Heavy reliance on aid instead of normal trade.

8.2. Financial and Liquidity Crisis

- Severe shortage of cash in circulation, with cash-out commissions reaching unprecedented levels (30–50%).
- Extremely weak consumer purchasing power due to halted incomes and loss of livelihoods.

8.3. Destruction and Operational Constraints

Widespread destruction of infrastructure (factories, workshops, shops, warehouses).

- Power outages, fuel shortages, and communication cuts hindering production and distribution.
- Lack of raw materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance and operations.

8.4. Rising Operating Costs and Prices

- Abnormal spikes in the prices of essential goods and fuel.
- Weakened competitiveness due to rising costs alongside declining demand.

8.5. Security Risks and Instability

- Ongoing threats of military operations and evacuation orders.
- Difficulties in the movement of people and goods between governorates.
- Inability to plan long-term due to political and security uncertainty.

8.6. Weak Investment Environment

- Absence of incentives or investment protection measures.
- Reluctance of local and international investors to inject new capital.
- Dependence of the private sector on small-scale, basic activities merely to survive.

9. Recommendations:

1. Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies

- a. **Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
- b. **Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
- c. **Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.

2. Energy and Infrastructure

- a. **Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
- b. Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities, including storage and cold storage units, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
- c. Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks to access all crossings and routes, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
- d. **Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.

3. Agricultural Recovery

- a. Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs—seeds, tools, fertilizers—to support small farmers and reduce dependence on external supplies.
- b. Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in trade, industry, and agriculture.

4. Market Stability and Financial Access

a. **Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems** among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring **power and internet** access.

- b. **Find effective, transparent mechanisms** to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper **prioritization and distribution**.
- c. **Introduce market control measures** to **prevent monopolies**, regulate **pricing**, and **reduce inflation**, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the worsening humanitarian crisis, stabilizing economic conditions, and supporting long-term recovery in Gaza.

10. Conclusion

The Week 55 report (12–18 August 2025) highlights the ongoing severe humanitarian crisis and the continued Israeli war on the Gaza Strip. During this week, 981 trucks entered Gaza. yet 57% were looted before reaching their destinations, leaving only 425 trucks successfully delivered. Humanitarian aid dominated the flow, with 676 trucks, while only 305 trucks carried commercial goods, reflecting the continued heavy reliance on relief supplies. Most shipments consisted of food items (504 trucks), food parcels (295 trucks), and flour (153 trucks), whereas medical supplies and fuel were minimal, and hygiene products were completely absent. The entry of commercial goods since 5 August slightly improved market availability, resulting in notable reductions in some food prices; however, essential commodities remain extremely expensive compared to pre-war levels, with staples such as tomato and onion increasing by 5,400% and 3,472% respectively. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI) shows a short-term decline from 2,993% in July to 1,558% in August, yet prices remain far above pre-war levels, reflecting ongoing hyperinflation. Daily cash-out commissions fluctuated sharply from 50% to 28%, stabilizing around 37%, highlighting liquidity instability and increasing pressure on households. The private sector operates under severe constraints due to restricted goods entry, infrastructure destruction, liquidity shortages, rising costs, and security risks, limiting economic activity to subsistence levels. The report recommends increasing humanitarian aid, facilitating commercial imports, restoring energy and infrastructure, supporting agricultural recovery, and implementing market stabilization measures. Without immediate intervention, both economic conditions and the humanitarian situation are expected to deteriorate further, exacerbating the hardships faced by Gaza's nearly two million residents.