



Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

Week 64: October 13-19, 2025

Week 65: October 20-26, 2025

In this Report:

1. Weeks 64–65 saw a continued ceasefire with partially stabilized but still limited goods flow.
2. Commercial trucks made up 21% of arrivals, humanitarian aid 79%, only 10% of humanitarian shipments were looted .
3. Trucks passed through two crossings, Karem Abu Salem (KAS) 1,399 trucks (65%), and Kissufim 754 trucks (35%).
4. UN agencies handled two-thirds of humanitarian aid, ensuring stable inflows.
5. Food made up about 71% of commercial truck flow, and 67% of humanitarian shipments with limited non-food items and slight diversification in week 65.
6. Fresh and frozen foods surged 900–1,200%, while imported staples rose 10–50%.
7. GCPI fell sharply in October, reflecting improved goods availability and partial price easing.
8. Cash-out commissions dropped to 24% in October after peaking at 42%, reflecting wider e-payment adoption.

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

1. Executive Summary:

- This report, covers **Week 64** (October 13-19, 2025) and **Week 65** (October 20-26, 2025), The period witnessed a **continued ceasefire** with a relative **stabilization** in the flow of goods, although the volume remains significantly **below** the required level.
- Between October 13-26, 2025, a total of **2,153 trucks entered Gaza Strip**, of which **173** (8%) were looted and **1,980** (92%) were delivered.
- **Humanitarian** aid accounted for the majority of arriving trucks at **1,708 trucks (79%)**, whereas **Commercial** trucks accounted for **445 (21%)**.
- The overall trend shows **stable but slightly improvement in truck inflows** in the second week, with a **4% week-to-week increase**.
- Trucks passed through **two crossings only**, **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)** was the most **active** with a total of **1,399 trucks (65%)**, followed by **Kissufim** with **754 trucks (35%)**, while **West Erez (Zikim)** and **Route 96 Gate** recorded **no movement (0%)**.
- **UN agencies** accounting for about **two-thirds** of humanitarian deliveries. The data indicates stable inflows across the two weeks and continued reliance on **UN channels** as the main conduit for aid.
- **Food items comprising about 67%** of humanitarian shipments. While **non-food aid (fuel, medical, shelter, hygiene)** remained limited, a **slight diversification in aid types** during the second week signalled **gradual improvement in humanitarian coordination**.
- **About 10%** of humanitarian shipments **were looted**, mostly during the first week. Following the **ceasefire**, looting incidents dropped sharply, while **all commercial trucks reached their destinations safely**.
- **Commercial trucks flow** reflecting **limited market activity** focused mainly on **food and essential goods** ($\approx 71\%$). Despite a **3% decline in the second week** due to crossing constraints, **vital supplies such as frozen meat and cooking gas remained steady**, ensuring **minimal market continuity**.
- Market data indicates **extreme price surges of 900–1,200%** for key fresh and frozen foods, reflecting persistent shortages despite the ceasefire, while **imported staples** like rice and oil show **relative stability (10–50% increase)**.
- Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI) continued its **downward trend** since August, with the basket's value in October 2025 declining sharply compared to September, reflecting improved goods availability and partial price easing.
- Cash-out commission rates in Gaza **peaked midyear at 42%** before declining to **24% in October 2025**, reflecting wider acceptance of electronic payments.
- The current **mechanism** for bringing commercial goods into the Gaza Strip remains **unclear and lacks transparency**, as no **clear criteria or timeline** for implementation have been announced, leaving the private sector and markets in a state of **confusion and anticipation**.
- The **private sector in Gaza** faces a highly **fragile environment**, grappling with **restricted goods entry, liquidity shortages, infrastructure destruction, and rising costs**, forcing most businesses to operate at minimal survival levels.

2. Crossing Status and Truck Flow:

Disclaimer: The figures presented in this report regarding the number, type, and delivery status of humanitarian and commercial trucks are the result of thorough research and verification efforts by the Gaza Chamber of Commerce team. Every effort has been made to achieve the highest possible accuracy. However, due to significant challenges in accessing fully reliable data, including unclear coordination mechanisms, lack of transparency, and the absence of a sovereign Palestinian authority overseeing crossings, these numbers cannot be guaranteed to be 100% precise. They should be interpreted as the best estimates currently available based on available information.

2.1. Trucks by Crossings:

Table (1) shows data on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 13/10/2025 to 26/10/2025, broken down by crossing points, with totals for each week.

2.1.1. Quantitative Analysis

- Total number of trucks that entered during the two weeks: **2,153 trucks**.
- Distribution by crossing:
 - **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)**: 1,399 trucks (**≈65%** of total).
 - **Kissufim**: 754 trucks (**≈35%** of total).
 - **West Erez and Route 96**: no truck movement recorded during the period.

2.1.2. Weekly Breakdown

- **Week 64 (13–19 October)**:
 - **1,062 trucks** entered.
 - Daily average: **≈152 trucks**.
 - **Highest flow**: Tuesday, 14 Oct. (198 trucks); **lowest**: Friday, 17 Oct. (100 trucks).
 - Slight midweek decline followed by modest recovery on Sunday.
- **Week 65 (20–26 October)**:
 - **1,091 trucks** entered.
 - Daily average rose slightly to **≈156 trucks**, marking a **4% increase** compared to the previous week.
 - **Highest flow**: Monday, 20 Oct. (194 trucks); **lowest**: Friday, 24 Oct. (103 trucks).

2.1.3. Overall Trend

- The data indicates a **relatively stable inflow** of trucks over the two-week period, with a **slight upward trend** in the second week.
- Continued **heavy reliance on (KAS)** as the main entry point for goods, with limited operation of **Kissufim**, which accounted for roughly one-third of the total flow.
- No activity through other crossings (**West Erez or Route 96**), reflecting ongoing restrictions on diversifying entry channels.

Table (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (October 13-26, 2025).

#	Day	Date	Number of Entered Trucks				
			KAS	West Erez	Route 96	Kissufim	Total
1	Monday	13/10/2025	120	0	0	65	185
2	Tuesday	14/10/2025	129	0	0	69	198
3	Wednesday	15/10/2025	97	0	0	52	149
4	Thursday	16/10/2025	98	0	0	53	151
5	Friday	17/10/2025	65	0	0	35	100
6	Saturday	18/10/2025	71	0	0	39	110
7	Sunday	19/10/2025	110	0	0	59	169
Subtotal 1 (Week 64)			690	0	0	372	1,062
8	Monday	20/10/2025	126	0	0	68	194
9	Tuesday	21/10/2025	125	0	0	67	192
10	Wednesday	22/10/2025	100	0	0	54	154
11	Thursday	23/10/2025	99	0	0	53	152
12	Friday	24/10/2025	67	0	0	36	103
13	Saturday	25/10/2025	87	0	0	47	134
14	Sunday	26/10/2025	105	0	0	57	162
Subtotal 2 (Week 65)			709	0	0	382	1,091
Total			1,399	0	0	754	2,153




Figure (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (13-26 October, 2025)

TRUCK ENTRIES INTO GAZA STRIP BY CROSSING




Figure (2): Distribution of Entered Trucks by Crossing (13-26 October, 2025).

2.2. Humanitarian trucks:

2.2.1. Trucks by Organization:

During the period from 13 to 26 October 2025, a total of **1,708** humanitarian aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip through various organizations, representing approximately **79% of the total truck movement** during this period. **UN agencies** (WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, IOM, FAO) accounted for the largest share with about **62%** (1,056 trucks), followed by **Others** (bilateral entry includes: Egyptian Committee, Al-Fares Al-Shahm, Qatari aid) with **16%**, then **WCK** (World Central Kitchen) with **15%**. The remaining share was distributed among a limited number of other organizations such as **AH&H** (All Hands & Hearts), **CRS** (Catholic Relief Services), **GEM** (Global Empowerment Mission), **MSF** (Médecins Sans Frontières | Medical humanitarian organisation), **ICRC** (International Committee of the Red Cross) **Acted**, and **Oxfam**. Both weeks recorded nearly similar levels of inflow (836 and 872 trucks, respectively), with a slight increase in activity by UN agencies and AH&H, contrasted by a decline in WCK's contribution during the second week. This pattern reflects a relatively heavy reliance on the UN system as the primary channel for aid delivery into the Strip.

Table (2): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries to Gaza by Organization (October 13-26, 2025).

Date	UN Agencies	WCK	ICRC	MSF	AH&H	OXFAM	GEM	CRS	Acted	Others	Total
13/10/2025	87	27	0	0	3	0	5	5	0	26	153
14/10/2025	83	27	4	0	5	0	2	5	1	36	163
15/10/2025	68	22	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	18	112
16/10/2025	73	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	118
17/10/2025	49	16	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	67
18/10/2025	58	19	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	82
19/10/2025	68	22	0	0	6	0	3	15	0	27	141
Subtotal 1 (Week 64)	486	156	4	0	14	0	14	32	1	129	836

Date	UN Agencies	WCK	ICRC	MSF	AH&H	OXFAM	GEM	CRS	Acted	Others	Total
20/10/2025	102	19	0	0	12	0	4	0	0	27	164
21/10/2025	97	18	0	4	15	2	4	0	0	19	159
22/10/2025	80	15	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	19	124
23/10/2025	86	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	119
24/10/2025	57	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	71
25/10/2025	68	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	104
26/10/2025	80	15	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	28	131
Subtotal 2 (Week 65)	570	104	5	4	40	2	8	0	0	139	872
Total	1,056	260	9	4	54	2	22	32	1	268	1,708




Figure (3): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries to Gaza by Organization (October 13-26, 2025).

2.2.2. Trucks by Commodity

Food items of all types, including **dry foods**, **food parcels**, and **flour**, accounted for around **67%** of **humanitarian** incoming trucks, underscoring the continued focus of aid operations on meeting urgent food needs. In contrast, the share of other vital sectors remained limited, as **fuel** and **medical supplies** together made up only about **6%** of the total, while **shelter** and **hygiene materials** represented approximately **22%**. The data indicates a **slight improvement in the diversity of aid** during the second week, particularly in hygiene and shelter materials, reflecting a gradual enhancement in humanitarian coordination despite the ongoing emphasis on **emergency food relief**.

Table (3): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Type of Supplies (October 13-26, 2025).

#	Item	Number of Trucks		
		Week 64 (October 13-19, 2025)	Week 65 (October 20-26, 2025)	Total
1	Food Items	125	112	237
2	Food Parcels	195	215	410
3	Flour	285	285	570
4	shelter	33	16	49
5	Hygiene Material	22	28	50
6	Fuel	102	108	210
7	Medical Supplies	65	96	161
8	Solid Fuel	4	1	5
9	Agriculture & Livestock	5	11	16
Total		836	872	1,708

Breakdown of Entered Trucks by Type of Goods (Weeks 64–65)




Figure (4): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Type of Supplies (October 13-26, 2025).

2.2.3. Delivery Vs. Looted Status

from a total of **1,708 humanitarian aid trucks** entered the Gaza Strip During the period, **1,535** were successfully **delivered**, while **173** trucks were **looted**, representing about **10% of the total**. Most looting incidents occurred during **the first week (167 trucks)**, while they **sharply declined to only 6 cases in the second week**, reflecting a **notable improvement in security measures and field coordination**. This decline began following the **entry into force of the ceasefire**, which enabled the strengthening of monitoring and logistical escort mechanisms for aid convoys, contributing to more efficient delivery of assistance to beneficiaries and reinforcing the stability of the humanitarian operating environment in the Strip.

Table (4): Status of Humanitarian Aid Truck Deliveries and Looting Incidents (October 13-26, 2025)

#	Day	Date	Number of Entered Trucks		
			Looted	Delivered	Total
1	Monday	13/10/2025	29	124	153
2	Tuesday	14/10/2025	30	133	163
3	Wednesday	15/10/2025	23	89	112
4	Thursday	16/10/2025	25	93	118
5	Friday	17/10/2025	18	49	67
6	Saturday	18/10/2025	19	63	82
7	Sunday	19/10/2025	23	118	141
Subtotal 1 (Week 64)			167	669	836
8	Monday	20/10/2025	0	164	164
9	Tuesday	21/10/2025	1	158	159
10	Wednesday	22/10/2025	1	123	124
11	Thursday	23/10/2025	0	119	119
12	Friday	24/10/2025	1	70	71
13	Saturday	25/10/2025	1	103	104
14	Sunday	26/10/2025	2	129	131
Subtotal 2 (Week 65)			6	866	872
Total			173	1,535	1,708

STATUS OF HUMANITARIAN AID TRUCK DELIVERIES AND LOOTING INCIDENTS (OCTOBER 13-26, 2025)




Figure (5): Status of Humanitarian Aid Truck Deliveries and Looting Incidents (October 13-26, 2025)

2.3. Commercial trucks:

The following table illustrates the distribution of **commercial trucks** entering the Gaza Strip by **type of goods** during the period from **13 to 26 October 2025**, totaling **445 trucks**, reflecting a limited commercial activity in local markets. The data indicates a relative stability in the inflow of essential commodities, with a slight decline during the second week due to

operational constraints at the crossings. The figures confirm the continued prioritization of **food** and **daily consumer** goods, while **fuel** and **shelter materials** remain limited. This pattern highlights the focus of trade movements on meeting the population's **basic needs** and maintaining market continuity at a **minimal operational level**.

2.3.1. Quantitative Overview

- A total of **445 trucks** entered during the two-week period, **226 in Week 64** and **219 in Week 65**, representing a **3% decrease** in the second week.
- Food commodities (dry foods, fruits and vegetables, frozen meat) accounted for the largest share with **316 trucks**, equivalent to **71% of the total**.
- The category labeled "**Others**", which includes non-essential food and beverage products such as: (coffee, nuts, soft drinks, spices, noodles, and chocolate), represented **15% of the total**.
- Cooking gas (**25 trucks, 6%**), shelter materials (**23 trucks, 5%**), and Hygiene Materials (**16 trucks, 4%**).

2.3.2. Weekly Breakdown

- **Week 64 (13–19 October):**
 - Recorded (**226 trucks**), with a strong concentration in fresh, frozen and canned food products (**161 trucks, 71%**).
 - Peak days were Tuesday and Wednesday (**14–15 October**) with a combined **72 trucks**, while a sharp drop occurred on Saturday and Sunday (**14–15 October**) with a combined **56 trucks**.
- **Week 65 (20–26 October):**
 - The total declined to **219 trucks**, with a noticeable decrease in Hygiene Materials imports (**-67%**) and Fruits and Vegetables (**-14%**), and a noticeable increase in Frozen Meat imports (**+33%**) and Others (**+24%**).

Table (5): Distribution of Commercial Trucks by Type of Goods (October 13-26, 2025)

Date	Food Items	Fruits and Vegetables	Hygiene Materials	Frozen Meat	Shelter Materials	Cooking Gas	Others	Total
13/10/2025	10	14	2	1	0	0	5	32
14/10/2025	14	8	5	0	3	4	1	35
15/10/2025	14	12	0	0	2	4	5	37
16/10/2025	18	8	0	0	0	4	3	33
17/10/2025	8	12	2	2	4	0	5	33
18/10/2025	12	9	1	0	1	0	5	28
19/10/2025	8	11	2	0	2	0	5	28
Subtotal 1 (Week 64)	84	74	12	3	12	12	29	226
20/10/2025	12	9	0	0	1	0	7	29
21/10/2025	15	7	2	0	0	0	9	33
22/10/2025	8	9	0	2	2	4	6	31
23/10/2025	11	12	0	0	0	5	5	33
24/10/2025	14	9	0	0	5	0	4	32
25/10/2025	15	9	1	0	0	0	5	30
26/10/2025	12	9	1	2	3	4	0	31
Subtotal 2 (Week 65)	87	64	4	4	11	13	36	219
Total	171	138	16	7	23	25	65	445




Figure (6): Distribution of Commercial Trucks by Type of Goods (October 13-26, 2025).

3. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

This section presents a **detailed comparison** of prices for a range of **essential goods**, food and non-food items, in the Gaza Strip during Weeks 64 and 65 (October 13–26, 2025), compared to pre-war levels, highlighting **differences** between the **northern** and **southern** regions of the Strip.

3.1. Food Items:

The data shows that most items still record **very sharp increases compared to pre-war prices**, particularly **fresh and frozen food commodities**. Prices of **flour and frozen chicken** have surged by **900% to 1,200%**, reflecting the continued shortage of key food supplies despite the ceasefire. Significant increases are also seen in the prices of **vegetables and fruits** such as tomato, pepper, eggplant, and lemon, which rose by **400% to over 1,100%** in some cases, due to disruptions in local production and high transportation and storage costs.

In contrast, imported goods such as **rice, vegetable oil, and sugar** have shown relative stability, with increases ranging between **10% and 50%**, indicating a slight improvement in their availability through border crossings. It is also noted that **prices in the northern part of Gaza remain slightly higher than in the south** (by about 3–10%), attributed to **internal transportation difficulties** and differences in stock levels between areas. Overall, the data reflects the persistence of **severe inflationary pressures** on fresh and basic goods, alongside **signs of gradual stabilization** for dry and imported commodities.

Table (6): Price Trends and Regional Differences of Food Consumer Goods (Weeks 64–65).

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Price Average (Week 64)		Price Average (Week 65)	
				North	South	North	South
1	Flour	Sack (25Kg)	35.00	75.71	67.86	176.79	171.43
2	Frozen chicken	Kg	8.00	94.00	88.00	81.25	81.25
3	Pepper	Kg	10.00	51.14	56.86	72.86	54.86
4	Frozen chicken wing	Kg	6.00	85.00	80.00	70.00	70.00
5	Banana	Kg	2.50	36.40	40.83	20.14	20.57
6	Garlic	Kg	10.00	23.43	21.71	16.86	16.00
7	Eggplant	Kg	2.00	15.14	10.14	15.57	12.86
8	Apple	Kg	5.00	22.60	22.83	14.71	17.14
9	Tomato	Kg	2.00	34.86	24.57	14.29	13.43
10	Lemon	Kg	4.00	31.43	20.29	11.86	12.29
11	Orange	Kg	4.00	16.00	19.17	11.00	9.71
12	Cucumber	Kg	2.00	17.00	17.86	9.57	9.14
13	Rice	Kg	8.00	8.86	8.57	9.43	9.00
14	Vegetable Oil	Liter	9.00	9.29	7.57	8.86	8.00
15	Macaroni	Kg	2.50	7.29	4.00	8.43	7.14
16	Potato	Kg	2.00	13.57	11.71	7.43	7.43
17	Onion	Kg	2.00	12.14	10.71	7.43	7.71
18	Kidney beans	Kg	7.00	6.57	4.00	6.71	4.86
19	Sugar	Kg	3.00	4.00	3.86	5.00	5.00




Figure (7): Price Trends and Regional Differences of Food Consumer Goods (Weeks 64–65).

3.2. Non-Food Items:

During **Weeks 64 and 65**, prices of **non-food** consumer goods in the **Gaza Strip** experienced a **significant increase** compared to **pre-war levels**, particularly for **laundry detergent, dishwashing liquid, and sanitary towels**, while **soap prices** remained **relatively stable**. Clear regional differences were observed in **Week 64**, with **prices higher in the North** by **33% to 59%** for most goods, whereas **Week 65** saw a **significant reduction** in these **disparities**, bringing them down to **8%–10% or less**, with some differences persisting for **firewood**. The data also showed **slight stabilization** or **modest declines** in **prices** for most items between the two weeks, indicating a **relative improvement** in **goods distribution and market stability**, although **prices remain substantially higher** than **pre-war levels**.

Table (7): Price Trends and Regional Differences of Non-Food Consumer Goods (Weeks 64–65).

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Average Price (Week 64)		Average Price (Week 65)	
				North	South	North	South
1	Baby diapers	Pack (40 pcs)	29.00	33.86	32.86	30.00	30.29
2	laundry detergent	Kg	8.00	27.57	17.29	18.43	17.00
3	Dishwashing liquid	Liter	6.00	21.00	15.00	11.86	11.00
4	sanitary towels	Pack (10 pcs)	6.00	9.71	7.29	7.86	7.14
5	firewood	Kg	0.50	4.00	4.57	3.64	4.43
6	Soap	Piece	2.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00




Figure (8): Price Trends and Regional Differences of Non-Food Consumer Goods (Weeks 64–65).

4. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

4.1. GCPI – Long Term Trend

The **downward trend** in the **value of the consumer basket** and its corresponding **price index** has continued since last **August**. During the current month, **October 2025**, the basket's **value** experienced a **significant decline** compared to **September**, reaching **599.46 ILS** in the North and **328.25 ILS** in the South, compared to a **unified price of 908.76 ILS** in September. This decrease was also reflected in the **index (GCPI)**, which recorded **648%** in the North and **355%** in the South, compared to **983%** in the previous month. This decline reflects a **partial improvement** in the **availability** of essential goods and a **reduction** in the prices of many basic items following **sharp increases** in **June and July**, while a **price gap** between the **North and South** was observed due to the **closure of crossings** leading to northern Gaza and the **separation of the North and South** until 10 October. Despite this **improvement**, the cost of the basket remains **significantly higher** than **normal pre-war levels**.

Table (8): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to October 2025

Month	Basket value (ILS)			index value (%)		
	North	South	unified price	North	South	unified price
Nov-24	1,987.06	782.00	-	2,150%	846%	-
Dec-24	1,251.87	837.60	-	1,354%	906%	-
Jan-25	584.32	395.76	-	632%	428%	-
Feb-25	-	-	156.59	-	-	169%
Mar-25	-	-	385.03	-	-	417%
Apr-25	-	-	775.88	-	-	839%
May-25	-	-	1,857.71	-	-	2,010%
Jun-25	-	-	2,611.37	-	-	2,825%
July-25	-	-	2,766.49	-	-	2,993%
Aug-25	-	-	1,344.21	-	-	1454%
Sep-25	-	-	908.76	-	-	983%
Oct-25	599.46	328.25	-	648%	355%	-

4.2. GCPI – Short Term Fluctuation

The following table presents the **daily value of the consumer basket in ILS** and the **price index in percentage terms** for the North and South of the Gaza Strip during the period from **13 to 26 October 2025**, allowing for an analysis of the **daily trends in basket value and price fluctuations**. The table reflects the **daily price volatility of the consumer basket**, influenced by factors such as **availability of goods, crossing restrictions, and local demand**. The North is generally more expensive than the South, although on some days the opposite occurs due to these factors.

4.2.1. Overall Trend:

- The basket value and price index showed **clear daily fluctuations**, with a general decline in the middle of the month before prices began to rise again toward the end of the period.
- The **highest basket value** was recorded on **17 October**, reaching **425.79 ILS in the North** and **348.79 ILS in the South**, with a **price index of 461%** and **377%**, respectively.
- The **lowest basket value** was recorded on **23 October**, at **232.14 ILS in the North** and **226.64 ILS in the South**, with a **price index of 251%** and **245%**.

4.2.2. North-South Differences:

- On most days, the basket was **more expensive in the North** than in the South, although on **20 and 26 October**, prices in the North fell below those in the South, reflecting variations in **goods availability** and **differences in purchasing power**.

4.2.3. Weekly Trend:

- Week 64 (13–19 October):** Saw **relative increases** at the beginning of the week, peaking on 17 October, followed by a **notable drop on 19 October**.
- Week 65 (20–26 October):** Experienced **fluctuating stability**, with a decline on 22–23 October followed by a gradual rise toward 26 October, indicating continued daily market volatility influenced by **goods availability** and **crossing constraints**.

Table (9): Daily Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (October 13-26, 2025).

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)		index value (%)	
		North	South	North	South
1	13/10/2025	412.19	284.55	446%	308%
2	14/10/2025	370.60	310.25	401%	336%
3	15/10/2025	351.44	307.08	380%	332%
4	16/10/2025	373.72	354.45	404%	383%
5	17/10/2025	425.79	348.79	461%	377%
6	18/10/2025	404.51	325.34	438%	352%
7	19/10/2025	291.81	279.19	316%	302%
8	20/10/2025	278.60	302.94	301%	328%
9	21/10/2025	303.51	295.94	328%	320%
10	22/10/2025	303.23	265.89	328%	288%
11	23/10/2025	232.14	226.64	251%	245%
12	24/10/2025	256.76	253.39	278%	274%
13	25/10/2025	275.51	268.79	298%	291%
14	26/10/2025	326.71	334.79	353%	362%




Figure (9): Daily Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (October 13-26, 2025).

5. Cash-out commission:

5.1. Long-term trend:

During the period from January to October 2025, the **cash-out commission in the Gaza Strip** experienced a significant increase, starting at 17% in January and gradually rising to a peak of 42% in June and July, before beginning a gradual decline to 36% in September. In October 2025, the commission recorded a notable decrease to 24%, reflecting the continued flow of commercial goods and the expansion of **items** and **stores** accepting **electronic payments**.

Table (10): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – October 2025).

Month	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	July-25	Aug-25	Sep-25	Oct-25
cash out commission (%)	17%	18%	27%	30%	32%	42%	42%	38%	36%	24%




Figure (10): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – October 2025).

5.2. Short-term fluctuation:

The following table shows the **daily cash-out commission (%)** in the Gaza Strip during the period from 13 to 26 October 2025. From the data in the table, the following observations can be made:

5.2.1. Overall Trend:

- The commission showed **notable daily fluctuations** between 10% and 24% during the period.
- The **lowest rate** was on 15 October at 10%, while the **highest rate** was recorded on 24 October at 24%.
- The table shows a **relatively upward trend over the two weeks**, especially toward the end of the second week.

5.2.2. Weekly Differences:

- Week 64 (13–19 October):** The commission ranged between 10% and 22%, with a noticeable drop on 15 October (10%) before gradually rising to 22% on 19 October.

- **Week 65 (20–26 October):** The commission mostly stabilized between 20% and 24%, with some temporary declines, such as on 25 and 26 October (21% and 20%).

Table (11): Daily cash out commission (October 13-26, 2025).

#	Date	cash out commission (%)
1	13/10/2025	15%
2	14/10/2025	15%
3	15/10/2025	10%
4	16/10/2025	17%
5	17/10/2025	17%
6	18/10/2025	17%
7	19/10/2025	22%
8	20/10/2025	20%
9	21/10/2025	20%
10	22/10/2025	20%
11	23/10/2025	23%
12	24/10/2025	24%
13	25/10/2025	21%
14	26/10/2025	20%




Figure (11): Daily cash out commission (13 – 26 October, 2025).

6. Coordination Mechanism:

Weeks 64 and 65 (September 19 – October 12, 2025) continued under the same mechanism, allowing the entry of both humanitarian aid and commercial goods into Gaza. However, the movement was restricted to crossings leading to southern Gaza only (KAS and Kissufim), while West Erez Crossing (Zikim) remained closed since September 12, and Route 96 gate since August 10.

Commercial goods continued to enter according to the mechanism announced by the Israeli side on August 5, 2025, which permits a limited number of local traders (from one to three traders only) to bring in goods based on undefined criteria and security checks, with no details provided regarding the mechanism or precise standards. According to the Israeli statement, the goods included basic food items, baby diapers, fruits and vegetables, and hygiene products.

Nevertheless, the majority of current flows—both humanitarian and commercial—remained largely limited to certain food supplies, with strict restrictions continuing on all other types of goods. Regarding the phenomenon of truck looting upon entering Gaza, it has decreased significantly compared to previous weeks, due to improvements in field and logistical conditions following the implementation of the ceasefire on 10 October 2025.

7. Difficulties:

The private sector in Gaza is currently operating in a highly fragile environment. On one hand, it faces commercial and financial strangulation due to restrictions on crossings and liquidity shortages. On the other hand, it suffers from infrastructure destruction and declining demand. As a result, most economic activities have shifted toward survival at a minimum level rather than growth or development. Below are the main challenges facing the economic sectors in Gaza:

7.1. Restrictions on Goods Entry

- Closure of crossings or allowing only very limited items and quantities that do not meet market needs.
- Focus on some food and relief items, while raw materials and operational/production inputs are banned.
- Heavy reliance on aid instead of normal trade.

7.2. Financial and Liquidity Crisis

- Extremely weak consumer purchasing power due to halted incomes and loss of livelihoods.
- Severe shortage of cash in circulation, with cash-out commissions reaching unprecedented levels (30–50%), thus further weakening purchase power.

7.3. Destruction and Operational Constraints

- Widespread destruction of infrastructure (factories, workshops, shops, warehouses).
- Power outages, fuel shortages, and communication cuts hindering production and distribution.
- Lack of raw materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance and operations.

7.4. Rising Operating Costs and Prices

- Abnormal spikes in the prices of essential goods and fuel.
- Weakened competitiveness due to rising costs alongside declining demand.

7.5. Security Risks and Instability

- Ongoing threats of military operations and evacuation orders.
- Difficulties in the movement of people and goods between governorates.
- Inability to plan long-term due to political and security uncertainty.

7.6. Weak Investment Environment

- Absence of incentives or investment protection measures.
- Reluctance of local and international investors to inject new capital.
- Dependence of the private sector on small-scale, basic activities merely to survive.

8. Recommendations:

1. Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies

- a. **Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
- b. **Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
- c. **Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.

2. Energy and Infrastructure

- a. **Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
- b. **Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities**, including **storage and cold storage units**, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
- c. **Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks** to access **all crossings and routes**, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
- d. **Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.

3. Agricultural Recovery

- a. **Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs**—seeds, tools, fertilizers, animal fodder—to support small farmers and **reduce dependence on external supplies**.
- b. **Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations** (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in **trade, industry, and agriculture**.

4. Market Stability and Financial Access

- a. **Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems** among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring **power and internet** access.
- b. **Find effective, transparent mechanisms** to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper **prioritization and distribution**.
- c. **Introduce market control measures** to prevent **monopolies**, regulate **pricing**, and **reduce inflation**, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the **worsening humanitarian crisis**, stabilizing **economic conditions**, and supporting **long-term recovery** in Gaza.

9. Conclusion

The period from **13 to 26 October 2025** witnessed a relative stabilization of the humanitarian and economic situation in the Gaza Strip, coinciding with the continuation of the **ceasefire** and an improvement in the flow of aid and goods through the crossings. During this period, approximately **1,708 humanitarian aid trucks** entered the Strip, of which **1,535 trucks (90%) were successfully delivered**, while **173 trucks (10%)** were looted, most of them during the first week only. Looting incidents sharply declined in the second week thanks to enhanced protection measures and improved field coordination. At the same time, limited **commercial activity** was recorded, with **445 commercial trucks** entering Gaza, **226 during Week 64** and **219 during Week 65**, reflecting a slight **3% decrease** in the second week. **Food commodities** (dry and canned foods, vegetables, and frozen products) accounted for the largest share of commercial flows with **316 trucks (71%)**, **hygiene products (4%)**, **shelter materials** (clothing, shoes, winter blankets) for **(5%)**, and **cooking gas** for **(6%)**. This pattern reflects a continued focus of trade on meeting the population's **basic needs** and maintaining **minimal market operations**. In terms of prices, **inflation rates remain extremely high** compared to pre-war levels. Prices of **flour and frozen chicken** surged by **900–1200%**, while **vegetables and fruits** rose by **400–1100%**. In contrast, imported commodities such as **rice, vegetable oil, and sugar** showed relative stability, with limited increases of **10–50%**, and **price gaps between North and South Gaza** narrowed to only **3–10%**. **Non-food goods**, particularly cleaning materials, showed **relative stabilization** and improved market distribution. The **Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)** recorded a significant decline in October, as the value of the consumer basket reached **599 ILS in the North** and **328 ILS in the South**, compared to **909 ILS in September**, indicating a partial improvement in the availability of essential goods despite prices remaining well above normal levels. Meanwhile, the **cash-out commission** rate fell sharply to **24% in October**, down from its peak of **42%** in June and July, reflecting improved trade flows and the expansion of E-payment acceptance points across the Strip.