



إتحاد الغرف التجارية الصناعية الزراعية الفلسطينية
Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

Week 76: January 05-11, 2026

Week 77: January 12-18, 2026

In this Report:

- 1- A total of 3,812 trucks entered Gaza during Weeks 76 and 77 (5–18 January 2026).
- 2- Of these, 55% were humanitarian aid and 45% private sector.
- 3- There was heavy reliance on Karem Abu Salem (KAS) crossing (90%).
- 4- Food accounted for 80% of humanitarian deliveries.
- 5- Fresh vegetables and fruits prices rose 23–59% week-on-week.
- 6- Non-food prices were mostly stable, except baby diapers (+23%) and firewood (+11%).
- 7- GCPI peaked at 158% before easing to 152%, while cash-out commission ranged 12–15%.
- 8- The new Israeli mechanism, effective since 8 December 2025, limits commercial flexibility and imports.



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January 21, 2026

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

1. Executive Summary:

- This report, covers **Week 76** (January 05-11, 2026) and **Week 77** (January 12-18, 2026), The period witnessed a **continued fragile ceasefire** with a relative **stabilization** in the flow of goods, although the volume remains significantly **below** the required level.
- During the reporting period, **a total of 3,812** trucks entered the Gaza Strip, all of which were **delivered successfully**, with no incidents of looting reported.
- The incoming **trucks** were distributed between the **humanitarian sector**, with **2,083 trucks (55%)**, and the **private sector**, with **1,729 trucks (45%)**,
- Trucks passed through **two crossings**, **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)** was the **most active** with a total of **3,432 trucks (90%)**, and **West Erez (Zikim)** with **380 trucks (10%)**.
- **UN agencies** providing the majority (**42%**) of **humanitarian aid**, followed by (**WCK**) (**28%**), while contributions from other **international actors** were limited.
- **Food-related aid** dominated humanitarian inflows and accounting for **80% of deliveries**, while non-food items, including shelter, fuel, hygiene, medical, and livelihood support, remained limited.
- Private sector imports totalled **1,729 trucks**, with food-related commodities accounting for **65% of entries**. Non-food items, including shelter, cooking gas, and hygiene materials, remained limited.
- Fresh produce prices surged sharply in Week 77, with vegetables and fruits rising **23–59% week-on-week**, reflecting persistent shortages and high handling costs.
- In contrast, staple foods remained relatively stable, while protein and frozen items showed mixed trends, highlighting ongoing market volatility.
- Essential non-food prices remained largely stable in Week 77, with notable increases only in **baby diapers (+23%)** and **firewood (+11%)**, while most other items saw minimal change.
- **Diesel prices** declined slightly (**–3%**) but stayed far above pre-war levels, reflecting continued energy cost pressures.
- Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI) rose from (**128%**) to a peak of (**158%**), before slightly easing to (**152%**), reflecting ongoing market volatility.
- Cash-out commission remained stable at **12–15%**, mostly around 13–14%. No significant spikes were observed.
- The **new Israeli-imposed mechanism**, which became mandatory since 8 December, restricts imports to **only ten Palestinian traders** and requires all allowed goods to be purchased exclusively through **four Israeli suppliers**, significantly **limiting commercial flexibility**, reducing **market diversity**, and increasing **economic fragility**.
- The private sector in Gaza is operating under **severe commercial, financial, and operational constraints**, which have forced most businesses to shift from production and growth to mere **survival**.

2. Crossing Status and Truck Flow:

Disclaimer: The figures presented in this report regarding the number, type, and delivery status of humanitarian and commercial trucks are the result of thorough research and verification efforts by the Gaza Chamber of Commerce team. Every effort has been made to achieve the highest possible accuracy. However, due to significant challenges in accessing fully reliable data, including unclear coordination mechanisms, lack of transparency, and the absence of a sovereign Palestinian authority overseeing crossings, these numbers cannot be guaranteed to be 100% precise. They should be interpreted as the best estimates currently available based on available information. Should **more accurate data** for this period become available, the report will be **updated and republished** accordingly.

2.1. Trucks by Crossings:

The following table indicates a continued heavy reliance on **Karem Abu Salem Crossing (KAS)** as the primary entry point for trucks into the Gaza Strip during the period **5–18 January 2026**, while **Zikim Crossing** played a limited and intermittent role. **Route 96** and **Kissufim Crossing** remained completely closed throughout the reporting period. During **Week 76**, a total of **1,765 trucks** entered Gaza, of which **92%** passed through **(KAS)** and only **8%** via Zikim. The highest daily inflow was recorded on **Wednesday, 7 January 2026**, with **391 trucks**, while the lowest was on **Friday, 9 January 2026**, with only **90 trucks**.

In **Week 77**, the total number of incoming trucks increased to **2,047**, representing a **16% rise** compared to the previous week. This increase was mainly driven by higher volumes through **(KAS)**, which accounted for **1,810 trucks**, alongside a relative improvement in Zikim's contribution, totaling **237 trucks**, particularly on **12 and 16 January**. The highest daily inflow during the two-week period was observed on **Monday, 12 January 2026**, with **440 trucks**, while the lowest was on **Saturday, 17 January 2026**, at **55 trucks**.

Overall, with a combined total of **3,812 trucks** over the two weeks, the data highlight ongoing volatility in truck inflows and a structural dependency on a single operational crossing.

Table (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (05 to 18-Jan 2026).

#	Day	Date	Number of Entered Trucks				Total
			KAS	Zikim	Route 96	Kissufim	
1	Monday	05/01/2026	317	44	0	0	361
2	Tuesday	06/01/2026	323	0	0	0	323
3	Wednesday	07/01/2026	336	55	0	0	391
4	Thursday	08/01/2026	262	0	0	0	262
5	Friday	09/01/2026	90	0	0	0	90
6	Saturday	10/01/2026	69	44	0	0	113
7	Sunday	11/01/2026	225	0	0	0	225
Subtotal 1 (Week 76)			<u>1,622</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1,765</u>
8	Monday	12/01/2026	331	109	0	0	440
9	Tuesday	13/01/2026	432	0	0	0	432
10	Wednesday	14/01/2026	329	0	0	0	329
11	Thursday	15/01/2026	277	0	0	0	277
12	Friday	16/01/2026	92	128	0	0	220
13	Saturday	17/01/2026	55	0	0	0	55
14	Sunday	18/01/2026	294	0	0	0	294
Subtotal 2 (Week 77)			<u>1,810</u>	<u>237</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2,047</u>
Total			<u>3,432</u>	<u>380</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3,812</u>




Figure (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (05 to 18-Jan 2026).




Figure (2): Distribution of Entered Trucks by Crossing (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

2.2. Humanitarian trucks:

2.2.1. Trucks by Organization:

The table presents the daily and weekly distribution of humanitarian aid trucks by organization during the period **5–18 January 2026**, totaling **2,083 trucks**. During **Week 76**, **973 trucks** entered Gaza, increasing to **1,110 trucks** in **Week 77**, reflecting a **14% week-on-week increase**. This upward trend indicates a modest improvement in humanitarian access during the second week of the reporting period. Across the two weeks, **UN Agencies** remained the primary contributors, accounting for **872 trucks (42%)** of the total humanitarian inflow, followed by **World Central Kitchen (WCK)** with **574 trucks (28%)**. The category “**Others**” which contains (Egyptian committee, Al-Fares Al-Shahm and Qatari Aid) represented a significant share with **518 trucks (25%)**. Contributions from **ICRC, MSF, AH&H, GEM, CRS, and GAIN** remained comparatively limited and intermittent, collectively accounting for less than one-third of the total inflow.

Table (2): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries to Gaza by Organization (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

Date	UN Agencies	WCK	ICRC	MSF	AH&H	GEM	CRS	GAIN	Others	Total
05/01/2026	104	77	0	5	2	0	4	0	55	247
06/01/2026	78	50	5	0	0	3	0	2	43	181
07/01/2026	94	63	2	0	4	6	4	0	64	237
08/01/2026	37	27	0	0	0	2	0	0	33	99
09/01/2026	32	19	2	0	5	0	2	0	18	78
10/01/2026	35	18	0	0	0	5	0	0	10	68
11/01/2026	28	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	63
Subtotal 1 (Week 76)	<u>408</u>	<u>269</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>243</u>	<u>973</u>
12/01/2026	84	65	0	5	2	0	4	0	48	208
13/01/2026	121	78	5	0	2	3	0	2	68	279
14/01/2026	64	42	2	3	0	5	2	1	47	166
15/01/2026	58	42	0	0	5	2	0	5	44	156
16/01/2026	58	31	2	0	5	0	2	0	31	129
17/01/2026	37	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
18/01/2026	42	29	5	2	0	0	0	2	37	117
Subtotal 2 (Week 77)	<u>464</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>275</u>	1,110
Total	872	574	23	15	25	26	18	12	518	2,083

Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Organization (05 to 18 Jan 2026)




Figure (3): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries to Gaza by Organization (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

2.2.2. Trucks by Commodity

The following table illustrates the breakdown of humanitarian aid trucks by item category during **Week 76** and **Week 77**. **Food-related assistance** dominated the inflows across both weeks. **Food items, food parcels, and flour** together accounted for **1,673 trucks**, representing approximately **80% of total humanitarian deliveries**. **Shelter-related assistance** showed a marked rise from **75 trucks to 104 trucks**. **Fuel deliveries** remained relatively stable across the two weeks, increasing slightly from **45 to 48 trucks**, which remains limited given critical energy demands. **Hygiene materials** declined modestly in Week 77, while **medical supplies** remained consistently low, totaling only **32 trucks** across the entire period, raising concerns about healthcare system capacity. Deliveries of **solid fuel** ceased entirely in Week 77, and **agriculture and livestock inputs** remained minimal, with only **six trucks** recorded, indicating limited support for early recovery and livelihood restoration. Overall, the distribution highlights a continued focus on immediate life-saving food assistance, while non-food, health, and early recovery supplies remain constrained relative to needs.

Table (3): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Type of Supplies (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

#	Item	Number of Trucks		
		Week 76 (05 to 11 Jan 2026)	Week 77 (12 to 18 Jan 2026)	Total
1	Food Items	418	443	861
2	Food Parcels	238	272	510
3	Flour	125	177	302
4	shelter	75	104	179
5	Fuel	45	48	93
6	Hygiene Material	49	43	92
7	Medical Supplies	15	17	32
8	Solid Fuel	8	0	8
9	Agriculture & Livestock	0	6	6
	Total	973	1,110	2,083




Figure (4): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Type of Supplies (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

2.3. Commercial trucks:

The following table presents the daily and weekly distribution of **private sector trucks by commodity type** during the period **05–18 January 2026**, with a total of **1,729 trucks** recorded over the two weeks. Private sector inflows increased from **792 trucks in Week 76** to **937 trucks in Week 77**, representing an **18% week-on-week increase**. **Food-related commodities** dominated private sector imports throughout the period. **Food items, fruits and vegetables** and **Frozen foods and eggs** together accounted for **1,119 trucks**, or approximately **65% of total private sector entries**, highlighting the continued reliance on commercial imports to sustain food availability in local markets. **Shelter materials** and **cooking gas** remained relatively limited, totaling **80** and **54 trucks** respectively, which remains insufficient in light of extensive shelter damage and ongoing energy needs. **Hygiene materials** accounted for only **49 trucks** across the two weeks, suggesting continued pressure on non-food household supplies. The “**Others**” category was substantial, with **427 trucks**, includes non-essential food commodities such as nuts, coffee, soft drinks, noodles, chocolate, and others. Overall, while the increase in Week 77 reflects a partial recovery in private sector flows, volumes remain volatile and vulnerable to access constraints, reinforcing the need for more predictable and sustained commercial entry to support market stability and price moderation.

Table (4): Distribution of Commercial Trucks by Type of Goods (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

Date	Food Items	Fruits and Vegetables	Hygiene Materials	Frozen Foods and Eggs	Shelter Materials	Cooking Gas	Others	Total
05/01/2026	40	31	3	7	5	2	26	114
06/01/2026	40	21	4	9	14	6	48	142
07/01/2026	38	29	6	28	16	6	31	154
08/01/2026	47	36	4	37	2	2	35	163
09/01/2026	5	0	0	0	2	0	5	12
10/01/2026	15	8	0	4	2	0	16	45
11/01/2026	57	35	5	20	3	7	35	162
Subtotal 1 (Week 76)	<u>242</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>792</u>

Date	Food Items	Fruits and Vegetables	Hygiene Materials	Frozen Foods and Eggs	Shelter Materials	Cooking Gas	Others	Total
12/01/2026	116	45	5	14	11	5	36	232
13/01/2026	53	28	4	11	5	6	46	153
14/01/2026	51	42	5	13	8	6	38	163
15/01/2026	37	26	2	15	1	6	34	121
16/01/2026	26	15	7	8	5	0	30	91
17/01/2026	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18/01/2026	59	35	4	18	6	8	47	177
Subtotal 2 (Week 77)	342	191	27	79	36	31	231	937
Total	584	351	49	184	80	54	427	1,729




Figure (5): Distribution of Commercial Trucks by Type of Goods (05 to 18 Jan 2026).

3. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

This section presents a **detailed comparison** of prices for a range of **essential goods**, food and non-food items, in the Gaza Strip during Weeks 76 (January 05-11, 2026), and 77 (January 12-18, 2026), compared to pre-war levels.

3.1. Food Items:

The following table compares average prices of selected food commodities during **Week 76** and **Week 77** against pre-war levels, highlighting both week-on-week dynamics and longer-term inflationary pressures. Overall, the data reveal **sharp price escalation in fresh produce**, continued volatility across protein items, and **mixed trends in staple commodities**, reflecting ongoing supply disruptions and uneven market recovery. **Fresh vegetables and fruits recorded the most significant increases.** Prices of pepper, lemon, cucumber, tomato, and eggplant rose sharply in Week 77 compared to Week 76, with week-

on-week increases ranging from **23% to 59%**. These trends indicate persistent shortages and high transportation and handling costs. **Staple food items exhibited relative stability or slight deflation.** Rice, flour, vegetable oil, macaroni, sugar, and potato remained close to pre-war prices, with minimal week-on-week changes. **Protein and frozen products showed mixed movements.**

Table (5): Weekly Price Comparison of Food Essential Items (Week 76 vs. Week 77).

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 76		Week 77		% Change (W77 vs. W76)
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Pepper	Kg	10	11.71	17%	18.57	86%	59%
2	Lemon	Kg	4	6.00	50%	8.71	118%	45%
3	Cucumber	Kg	2	4.50	125%	6.14	207%	37%
4	Tomato	Kg	2	9.43	371%	11.86	493%	26%
5	Eggplant	Kg	2	5.00	150%	6.14	207%	23%
6	Banana	Kg	2.5	10.71	329%	12.00	380%	12%
7	Rice	Kg	8	6.00	-25%	6.57	-18%	10%
8	Apple	Kg	5	11.00	120%	11.71	134%	6%
9	Frozen veal	Kg	20	37.86	89%	38.29	91%	1%
10	Kidney beans	Kg	7	3.00	-57%	3.00	-57%	0%
11	Vegetable Oil	Liter	9	7.57	-16%	7.57	-16%	0%
12	Onion	Kg	2	3.50	75%	3.50	75%	0%
13	Garlic	Kg	10	13.00	30%	13.00	30%	0%
14	Sugar	Kg	3	4.36	45%	4.29	43%	-2%
15	Potato	Kg	2	3.36	68%	3.29	64%	-2%
16	Flour	Sack (25Kg)	35	25.00	-29%	24.43	-30%	-2%
17	Macaroni	Kg	2.5	2.93	17%	2.86	14%	-2%
18	Orange	Kg	4	5.86	46%	5.64	41%	-4%
19	Frozen chicken	Kg	8	21.86	173%	20.43	155%	-7%
20	Frozen chicken thigh	Kg	5	22.57	351%	21.00	320%	-7%
21	Egg	Kg	12	22.00	83%	20.43	70%	-7%
22	Frozen chicken wing	Kg	6	10.14	69%	8.86	48%	-13%




Figure (6): Weekly Price Comparison of Food Essential Items (Week 76 vs. Week 77).

3.2. Non-Food Items:

Prices of essential non-food items in **Week 77** remained relatively stable compared to **Week 76**, with only limited changes observed across most categories. **Baby diaper prices** increased by **23% week-on-week**, while **firewood** continued to record extremely high prices, rising by an additional **11%** and remaining one of the most inflated commodities. In contrast, prices of **soap, sanitary towels, dishwashing liquid, laundry detergent, and baby milk** showed no notable changes. **Diesel prices** declined slightly by **3%** compared to the previous week, yet they remain significantly higher than pre-war levels, reflecting persistent pressure on energy costs.

Table (6): Weekly Price Comparison of Non-Food Essential Items (Week 76 vs. Week 77).

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 76		Week 77		% Change (W77 vs. W76)
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Baby diapers	Pack (40 pcs)	29.00	16.29	-44%	20.00	-31%	23%
2	firewood	Kg	0.50	5.43	986%	6.00	1100%	11%
3	Soap	Piece	2.50	3.00	20%	3.00	20%	0%
4	sanitary towels	Pack (10 pcs)	6.00	5.00	-17%	5.00	-17%	0%
5	Dishwashing liquid	Liter	6.00	7.00	17%	7.00	17%	0%
6	laundry detergent	Kg	8.00	8.00	0%	8.00	0%	0%
7	Baby Milk	Can (400 gm)	25.00	27.14	9%	27.14	9%	0%
8	Diesel	Liter	6.00	40.00	567%	39.00	550%	-3%




Figure (7): Weekly Price Comparison of Non-Food Essential Items (Week 76 vs. Week 77).

4. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

4.1. GCPI – Long Term Trend

With a focus on the comparison between the **last two months (December 2025 and January 2026)**, the data indicate a **continued stabilization at relatively lower levels** compared to earlier periods. The basket value declined slightly from about **ILS 136 in December 2025 to ILS 135 in January 2026**, reflecting a **marginal decrease of less than**

1%. Similarly, the price index remained almost unchanged, moving from **147% to 146%**. This stability contrasts sharply with the extreme price volatility observed during mid-2025, indicating an easing—albeit fragile—of market pressures.

Table (7): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to 18 Jan 2026.

Month	Basket value (ILS)			index value (%)		
	North	South	unified price	North	South	unified price
Nov-24	1,987.06	782.00	-	2,150%	846%	-
Dec-24	1,251.87	837.60	-	1,354%	906%	-
Jan-25	584.32	395.76	-	632%	428%	-
Feb-25	-	-	156.59	-	-	169%
Mar-25	-	-	385.03	-	-	417%
Apr-25	-	-	775.88	-	-	839%
May-25	-	-	1,857.71	-	-	2,010%
Jun-25	-	-	2,611.37	-	-	2,825%
July-25	-	-	2,766.49	-	-	2,993%
Aug-25	-	-	1,344.21	-	-	1454%
Sep-25	-	-	908.76	-	-	983%
Oct-25	599.46	328.25	-	648%	355%	-
Nov-25	-	-	189.02	-	-	204%
Dec-25	-	-	135.80	-	-	147%
Jan-26	-	-	134.87	-	-	146%

4.2. GCPI – Short Term Fluctuation

During the period **5–18 January 2026**, the **daily consumer basket value in Gaza** showed a gradual upward trend with some fluctuations, reflecting ongoing market volatility. The basket value increased from **ILS 118 on 5 January (128%)** to a peak of **ILS 146 on 17 January (158%)**, before slightly declining to **ILS 141 (152%)** on 18 January. The highest week-on-week increases occurred between 9–12 January and again around 16–17 January, indicating short-term price pressures on essential goods. Overall, the index shows that consumer prices remain significantly above pre-war levels, maintaining a **persistent inflationary pressure** on household expenditures.

Table (8): Daily Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (05 to 18-Jan 26).

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)	index value (%)
1	05/01/2026	118	128%
2	06/01/2026	119	129%
3	07/01/2026	122	132%
4	08/01/2026	118	128%
5	09/01/2026	137	148%
6	10/01/2026	138	150%
7	11/01/2026	141	153%
8	12/01/2026	142	154%
9	13/01/2026	141	153%
10	14/01/2026	143	154%
11	15/01/2026	143	155%
12	16/01/2026	139	150%
13	17/01/2026	146	158%
14	18/01/2026	141	152%




Figure (8): The value of the basket (05 to 18 -Jan 26).

5. Cash-out commission:

5.1. Long-term trend:

Focusing on the **last two months (December 2025 and January 2026)**, the data indicate that the **cash-out commission has stabilized at 14%**, showing **no change month-on-month**. This follows a significant decline from higher levels earlier in the year, when commissions peaked at **42% in June and July 2025**.

Table (9): Monthly cash out commission rate (January-2025 to January 2026).

Month	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	July-25	Aug-25	Sep-25	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	Jan-26
cash out commission (%)	17%	18%	27%	30%	32%	42%	42%	38%	36%	23%	17%	14%	14%




Figure (9): Monthly cash out commission rate (January 2025 – January 2026).

5.2. Short-term fluctuation:

During **5–18 January 2026**, the **cash-out commission** in Gaza remained relatively stable, fluctuating between **12% and 15%**, with most days hovering around **13–14%**. The highest commission was recorded on **13 January (15%)**, while the lowest occurred on **17 January (12%)**. Overall, these figures indicate no significant spikes compared to previous months.

Table (10): Daily cash out commission (05 to 18-Jan 26).

#	Date	cash out commission (%)
1	05/01/2026	14%
2	06/01/2026	13%
3	07/01/2026	13%
4	08/01/2026	14%
5	09/01/2026	13%
6	10/01/2026	13%
7	11/01/2026	14%
8	12/01/2026	14%
9	13/01/2026	15%
10	14/01/2026	14%
11	15/01/2026	13%
12	16/01/2026	14%
13	17/01/2026	12%
14	18/01/2026	13%




Figure (10): Daily cash out commission (05 to 18-Jan 26).

6. Coordination Mechanism:

During the previous period, the **coordination mechanism** for the entry of **commercial goods** allowed a **limited number of Palestinian traders** to enter goods into Gaza Strip. The mechanism has an **unclear criterion**, focusing on specific goods such as some **basic food items, fruits and vegetables, and essential health products**. However, the Israeli side announced a **new mechanism** which started in a **trial phase** from **18 November to 7 December 2025**, and became **mandatory from December 8, 2025**. This mechanism stipulates that **all allowed goods** must be purchased **exclusively** from the **Israeli market** through **only four traders**, and **only ten Palestinian importers** are allowed to import under this mechanism.

This **strict restriction** has effectively **besieged Palestinian trade**, limiting the options available to traders and forcing them to rely on **restricted channels**, which negatively affects **liquidity, diversity of goods, and local market prices**, thereby **increasing the fragility of the Palestinian economy**. This mechanism reflects a **highly controlling approach** that **limits commercial flexibility** and **deepens existing economic challenges**.

The **new mechanism** also imposes significant challenges on **trade movement and the national economy**. The main risks include:

1. Lack of Transparency and Clear Criteria for Trader Selection

- No announced or professional criteria exist to determine eligible traders, creating room for favoritism and discrimination.
- This weakens fair competition and reduces opportunities for local traders to operate independently.

2. Disruption of the Natural Flow of Goods

- Limiting goods restricts the ability to freely import all essential commodities.
- This leads to shortages of basic goods, rising prices, and pressure on purchasing power.

3. Weakening the Private Sector and Reducing Job Opportunities

- Restricting trade freedom and targeting certain traders may weaken private sector activity and reduce local investment.
- Leads to job losses and higher unemployment due to reduced commercial activity.

4. Deepening Market Distortions

- Restrictions create structural market distortions, such as monopoly of certain goods or spread of informal trade.
- This reduces market stability and increases economic risks.

5. Threat to Economic and Social Stability

- Rising prices and shortages of essential goods can cause social pressure, especially on vulnerable groups.
- This mechanism hinders economic recovery and growth and weakens national food security.

7. Difficulties:

The private sector in Gaza is currently operating in a highly fragile environment. On one hand, it faces commercial and financial strangulation due to restrictions on crossings and liquidity shortages. On the other hand, it suffers from infrastructure destruction and declining demand. As a result, most economic activities have shifted toward survival at a minimum level rather than growth or development. Below are the main challenges facing the economic sectors in Gaza:

7.1. Restrictions on Goods Entry

- Closure of crossings or allowing only very limited items and quantities that do not meet market needs.
- Focus on some food and relief items, while raw materials and operational/production inputs are banned.
- Heavy reliance on aid instead of normal trade.

7.2. Financial and Liquidity Crisis

- Extremely weak consumer purchasing power due to halted incomes and loss of livelihoods.
- Severe shortage of cash in circulation, with cash-out commissions reaching (16%), thus further weakening purchase power.

7.3. Destruction and Operational Constraints

- Widespread destruction of infrastructure (factories, workshops, shops, warehouses).
- Power outages, fuel shortages, and communication cuts hindering production and distribution.
- Lack of raw materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance and operations.

7.4. Rising Operating Costs and Prices

- Abnormal spikes in the prices of essential goods and fuel.
- Weakened competitiveness due to rising costs alongside declining demand.

7.5. Security Risks and Instability

- Ongoing threats of military operations.
- Difficulties in the movement of people and goods between governorates.
- Inability to plan long-term due to political and security uncertainty.

7.6. Weak Investment Environment

- Absence of incentives or investment protection measures.
- Reluctance of local and international investors to inject new capital.
- Dependence of the private sector on small-scale, basic activities merely to survive.

8. Recommendations:

1. Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies

- a. **Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
- b. **Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
- c. **Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.

2. Energy and Infrastructure

- a. **Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
- b. **Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities**, including **storage and cold storage units**, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
- c. **Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks** to access **all crossings and routes**, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
- d. **Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.

3. Agricultural Recovery

- a. **Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs**—seeds, tools, fertilizers, animal fodder—to support small farmers and **reduce dependence on external supplies**.
- b. **Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations** (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in **trade, industry, and agriculture**.

4. Market Stability and Financial Access

- a. **Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems** among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring **power and internet** access.
- b. **Find effective, transparent mechanisms** to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper **prioritization and distribution**.
- c. **Introduce market control measures to prevent monopolies**, regulate **pricing**, and **reduce inflation**, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the **worsening humanitarian crisis**, stabilizing **economic conditions**, and supporting **long-term recovery** in Gaza.

9. Conclusion

During Weeks 76 and 77, a total of **3,812 trucks** entered Gaza, split between **2,083 humanitarian trucks (55%)** and **1,729 commercial trucks (45%)**, primarily via **Karem Abu Salem (90%)**, with Zikim playing a minor role. UN agencies led humanitarian deliveries (42%), followed by WCK (28%), with food dominating aid flows (80%), while non-food items such as shelter, fuel, hygiene, and medical supplies remained limited. Commercial imports were dominated by food commodities (65%), while shelter, cooking gas, and hygiene materials were constrained. **Market prices** showed continued volatility: fresh produce surged sharply (23–59% week-on-week), staples remained relatively stable, essential non-food items mostly unchanged except for baby diapers (+23%) and firewood (+11%), and diesel slightly declined (–3%) but stayed above pre-war levels. The **Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)** rose from 128% to a peak of 158%, easing slightly to 152%, while **cash-out commissions** remained stable at 12–15%. The **new Israeli import mechanism**, mandatory since 8 December 2025, severely limits private sector flexibility, restricting imports to ten Palestinian traders and four Israeli suppliers, deepening market fragility. The private sector continues to operate under extreme commercial, financial, and operational constraints, focusing on survival rather than growth. **Recommendations** include increasing humanitarian aid and non-food supplies, enabling private sector imports, supporting energy and storage infrastructure, facilitating agricultural recovery, and implementing market stability measures through price regulation and electronic payments to mitigate the ongoing humanitarian and economic crisis.