



Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

Week 68: November 10-16, 2025

Week 69: November 17-23, 2025

In this Report:

- The ceasefire continued during Weeks 68 and 69, leading to relative stabilization in the flow of goods into Gaza.
- A total of 4,027 trucks entered into Gaza Strip, with only 4 looted trucks.
- Incoming trucks were evenly split between humanitarian and commercial sectors.
- Trucks entered through 3 crossings, (KAS) leading at (78%), Kissufim (13%) and Zikim (8%).
- UN agencies delivered the majority of humanitarian aid (64%), while other international actors contributed minimally.
- Food items dominated 86% of humanitarian shipments and 73% of commercial shipments, with limited fuel, medical supplies, and shelter material.
- Week 69 saw declines in 15 food items and increases in only 4, yet most prices remain well above pre-war levels.
- (GCPI) fell from 237% to 149%.
- Cash-out commission rates dropped from 18% to 15%, then slightly increased to 16%.
- The mechanism for commercial goods entry remains unclear, subject to ambiguous conditions and illegal fees imposed on traders.

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

1. Executive Summary:

- This report, covers **Week 68** (November 10-16, 2025) and **Week 69** (November 17-23, 2025), The period witnessed a **continued fragile ceasefire** with a relative **stabilization** in the flow of goods, although the volume remains significantly **below** the required level.
- During the reporting period, a total of **4,027 trucks entered Gaza Strip**, of which **4** were looted and **4,023** were delivered.
- The incoming **trucks** were evenly distributed between the **humanitarian sector**, with **2,021 trucks (50%)**, and the **commercial sector**, with **2,006 trucks (50%)**,
- Trucks passed through **three crossings**, **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)** was the **most active** with a total of **3,154 trucks (78%)**, followed by **Kissufim** with **535 trucks (13%)**, then **West Erez (Zikim)** by 338 trucks (8%).
- **UN agencies** providing the majority (64%) of **humanitarian aid**, while contributions from other **international actors** were limited. **Truck entries** declined by ~25% in **week 69**, reflecting **fluctuating access conditions** and heavy reliance on **UN-led operations**.
- **Food items**, including dry foods, food parcels, and flour, accounted for around **86%** of **humanitarian trucks**, highlighting the focus on **urgent food needs**.
- Other sectors of **humanitarian aid** were limited: **hygiene materials (~6%)**, **shelter equipment (~5%)**, **medical supplies (<1.5%)**, and **Agriculture, Fuel, and Solid Fuel** combined (~1.5%).
- **Commercial trucks** dominated by **food commodities (73%)**, reflecting a continued focus on **essential goods**, while other categories like **shelter, hygiene, and cooking gas** remained minimal.
- **Weekly fluctuations** were notable in **commercial trucks**, with Week 69 seeing a **53% increase** compared to Week 68, driven by rising daily **consumer goods** flows.
- **Daily commercial trucks inflows** showed instability, peaking at **310 trucks** on 19 November and dropping to **8 trucks** on 22 November, indicating ongoing **market access challenges**.
- During Week 69, prices of **15 food items** declined, notably, while only **4 items** saw increases. Despite these changes, most **prices remain well above pre-war levels**, reflecting **market distortions** and **volatile supply flows**.
- Non-food item prices fluctuated between Week 68 and Week 69. Despite these changes, most items remain far above **pre-war levels**, notably **firewood (+900%)** and **diesel (+650%)**, highlighting rising **living costs** and **scarcity of essentials**.
- Between 10–23 November 2025, Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI) declined from **(237%)** to **(149%)**. This sustained decrease indicates **improving market conditions, greater food availability and decreasing purchasing power**.
- Between 10–23 November 2025, **cash-out commission rates** declined from **18%** (10–11 Nov) to **15%** (18–20 Nov), before slightly rising to **16%** (21–23 Nov).
- The current **mechanism** for bringing commercial goods into the Gaza Strip remains **unclear and lacks transparency**, leaving the private sector and markets in a state of **confusion and anticipation**.

2. Crossing Status and Truck Flow:

Disclaimer: The figures presented in this report regarding the number, type, and delivery status of humanitarian and commercial trucks are the result of thorough research and verification efforts by the Gaza Chamber of Commerce team. Every effort has been made to achieve the highest possible accuracy. However, due to significant challenges in accessing fully reliable data, including unclear coordination mechanisms, lack of transparency, and the absence of a sovereign Palestinian authority overseeing crossings, these numbers cannot be guaranteed to be 100% precise. They should be interpreted as the best estimates currently available based on available information. Should **more accurate data** for this period become available, the report will be **updated** and **republished** accordingly.

2.1. Trucks by Crossings:

Table (1) shows data on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 10/11/2025 to 23/11/2025, broken down by crossing points, with totals for each week.

2.1.1. Quantitative Analysis

- Total number of trucks that entered during the two weeks: **4,027 trucks**.
- Distribution by crossing:
 - **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)**: 3,154 trucks (**≈78%** of total).
 - **Kissufim**: 535 trucks (**≈13%** of total).
 - **West Erez**: 338 trucks (**≈9%** of total).
 - **Route 96**: no truck movement recorded during the period.

2.1.2. Weekly Breakdown

- **Week 68 (10 – 16 November)**:
 - **1, 950 trucks** entered.
 - Daily average: **≈279 trucks**.
 - **Highest flow**: Wednesday, 12 Nov. (461 trucks); **lowest**: Sunday, 16 Nov. (182 trucks).
- **Week 69 (17 –23 November)**:
 - **2,077 trucks** entered.
 - Daily average rose slightly to **≈297 trucks**, marking a **6% increase** compared to the previous week.
 - **Highest flow**: Monday, 17 Nov. (426 trucks); **lowest**: Saturday, 22 Nov. (53 trucks).

2.1.3. Overall Trend

- **KAS** remains the **primary** and most **relied-upon crossing** for the truck entry throughout the entire period.
- **West Erez** re-emerged **actively** in the second week, significantly **increasing its total contribution**.
- **Kissufim** plays a **supporting role** but remains **inconsistent**, with noticeable **day-to-day fluctuations**.
- **Route 96** was **completely closed** and recorded **no activity**.
- There was a **slight increase** in the total number of trucks in week 69 (**+6.5%**) compared to week 68.

Table (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (10-23 November, 2025).

#	Day	Date	Number of Entered Trucks				
			KAS	West Erez	Route 96	Kissufim	Total
1	Monday	10/11/2025	158	0	0	75	233
2	Tuesday	11/11/2025	278	0	0	42	320
3	Wednesday	12/11/2025	366	0	0	95	461
4	Thursday	13/11/2025	245	0	0	4	249
5	Friday	14/11/2025	152	0	0	63	215
6	Saturday	15/11/2025	165	82	0	43	290
7	Sunday	16/11/2025	182	0	0	0	182
Subtotal 1 (Week 68)			1,546	82	0	322	1,950
8	Monday	17/11/2025	348	78	0	0	426
9	Tuesday	18/11/2025	183	40	0	77	300
10	Wednesday	19/11/2025	358	50	0	38	446
11	Thursday	20/11/2025	253	23	0	93	369
12	Friday	21/11/2025	113	65	0	5	183
13	Saturday	22/11/2025	53	0	0	0	53
14	Sunday	23/11/2025	300	0	0	0	300
Subtotal 2 (Week 69)			1608	256	0	213	2,077
Total			3,154	338	0	535	4,027




Figure (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (November 10-23, 2025).

DISTRIBUTION OF ENTERED TRUCKS BY CROSSING
(NOVEMBER 10-23, 2025)




Figure (2): Distribution of Entered Trucks by Crossing (November 10-23, 2025).

2.2. Humanitarian trucks:

2.2.1. Trucks by Organization:

During the period **10–23 November 2025**, a total of **2,021 trucks** entered the Gaza Strip, including **1,291 trucks** from **UN agencies** (WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, IOM, FAO), which accounted for **64%** of all aid, a clear indication that humanitarian support continues to rely heavily on UN-led operations. The **Others** category (bilateral entry includes: Egyptian Committee, Al-Fares Al-Shahm, Qatari aid) contributed **337 trucks** (17%), followed by **WCK** (World Central Kitchen) with **200 trucks** (10%). Meanwhile, the contributions of organizations such as **CRS** (Catholic Relief Services) (89 trucks) and **ICRC** (International Committee of the Red Cross) (43 trucks) were moderate, and medical actors like **MSF** (Médecins Sans Frontières | Medical humanitarian organisation) and **IMC** (International Medical Corps) showed notably limited activity, with only 9 trucks combined. Total entries during the first week reached **1,156 trucks**, compared to **865 trucks** in the second week, an approximate **25% decrease**. Peak days included **12/11** (249 trucks) and **17/11** (210 trucks), while **16/11** and **22/11** recorded the lowest flows. Overall, the data reflects **fluctuating access conditions** and a **significant imbalance** among contributing agencies, with a heavy dependence on UN assistance and reduced participation from other international actors.

Table (2): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries to Gaza by Organization (November 10-23, 2025).

Date	UN Agencies	WCK	ICRC	MSF	AH&H	GEM	CRS	GAIN	IMC	IOM	others	Total
10/11/2025	125	14	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	21	166
11/11/2025	115	40	7	0	0	1	20	14	1	0	22	220
12/11/2025	201	15	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	28	249
13/11/2025	58	0	4	4	0	2	6	0	1	0	22	97
14/11/2025	70	13	4	0	0	0	52	0	0	0	18	157
15/11/2025	156	22	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	17	197
16/11/2025	48	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	70
Subtotal 1 (Week 68)	773	104	19	4	2	3	84	15	2	0	150	1,156

Date	UN Agencies	WCK	ICRC	MSF	AH&H	GEM	CRS	GAIN	IMC	IOM	others	Total
17/11/2025	158	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	210
18/11/2025	56	17	0	0	0	s	0	0	0	0	18	91
19/11/2025	92	0	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	35	136
20/11/2025	64	23	1	0	13	3	0	0	0	0	44	148
21/11/2025	43	25	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	19	93
22/11/2025	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	45
23/11/2025	75	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	35	142
Subtotal 2 (Week 69)	518	96	24	3	13	5	5	0	0	14	187	865
Total	1,291	200	43	7	15	8	89	15	2	14	337	2,021




Figure (3): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries to Gaza by Organization (10-23 November, 2025).

2.2.2. Trucks by Commodity

Food items of all types, including **dry foods**, **food parcels**, and **flour**, accounted for around **86%** of **humanitarian** incoming trucks, underscoring the continued focus of aid operations on meeting urgent food needs. In contrast, the share of other vital sectors remained limited, **hygiene materials** represented approximately **6%**, while **shelter equipment** represented about **5%**, and **medical supplies** represented **less than 1.5%**. Agriculture & Livestock, Fuel and Solid Fuel together made up only about **1.5%** of the total humanitarian trucks.

Table (3): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Type of Supplies (10-23 November, 2025).

#	Item	Number of Trucks		
		Week 68 (November 10-16, 2025)	Week 69 (November 17-23, 2025)	Total
1	Food Items	475	344	819
2	Food Parcels	354	265	619
3	Flour	169	135	304
4	Hygiene Material	68	48	116
5	shelter	59	45	104
6	Medical Supplies	15	15	30
7	Fuel	7	11	18
8	Agriculture & Livestock	3	2	5
9	Solid Fuel	6	0	6
Total		1,156	865	2,021




Figure (4): Humanitarian Aid Truck Entries by Type of Supplies (10-23 November, 2025).

2.2.3. Delivery Vs. Looted Status

During the period from **10–23 November 2025**, a total of **2,021 humanitarian aid trucks** entered the Gaza Strip, including **2,017 delivered** and **4 looted**, all occurring on a single day—**11 November 2025**—which reflects a high level of logistical discipline. This volume indicates notable stability, particularly in **Week 69**, during which **no looting incidents** were recorded. Overall, the performance during this period demonstrates an improvement in **supply chain control**, despite the relative decline in truck inflows observed in Week 69.

2.3. Commercial trucks:

During the reporting period, a total of **2,006 commercial trucks** entered Gaza, with a clear dominance of food items, which constituted the largest share of incoming goods, reflecting a continued commercial focus on essential commodities. Overall performance shows an **upward trend** in Week 69, where the total number of trucks increased by **53%** compared to week 68, driven by a significant rise in daily consumer goods, while other categories such as **shelter materials** and **hygiene supplies** declined. The period also witnessed sharp daily fluctuations, ranging from a peak of **310 trucks** on 19 November to a steep drop of **8 trucks** on 22 November, indicating persistent instability in market inflows despite the overall growth. In general, the data highlights a trend of expanding commercial activity, while import flows remain influenced by **shifting operational factors** that prevent consistent stability.

2.3.1. Quantitative Overview

- A total of **2,006 trucks** entered during the two-week period, **794 in Week 68** and **1,212 in Week 69**, representing a **53% increase** in the second week.
- Food commodities (dry foods, fruits and vegetables, frozen foods and eggs) accounted for the largest share with **1,459 trucks**, equivalent to **73% of the total**.
- The category labeled “**Others**”, which includes non-essential food and beverage products such as: (coffee, nuts, soft drinks, spices, noodles, and chocolate), represented **23%** of the total.
- Cooking gas (**18 trucks, 1%**), shelter materials (includes: clothing, shoes, winter blankets) (**30 trucks, 1%**), and Hygiene Materials (**46 trucks, 2%**).

2.3.2. Weekly Breakdown

- **Week 68 (10- 16 November):**
 - Recorded (**794 trucks**), with a strong concentration in fresh, frozen and canned food products (**555 trucks, 70%**).
 - Peak day were Wednesday (**12 November**) with a combined **212 trucks**, while a sharp drop occurred on Friday (**14 November**) with **58 trucks** only.
- **Week 69 (17–23 November):**
 - The total rose to **1,212 trucks**, with a noticeable decrease in Shelter Materials imports (**-42%**) and Hygiene Materials (**-8%**), and an increase in Fruits and Vegetables imports (**+71%**).

Table (4): Distribution of Commercial Trucks by Type of Goods (10-23 Nov, 2025)

Date	Food Items	Fruits and Vegetables	Hygiene Materials	Frozen Foods and Eggs	Shelter Materials	Cooking Gas	Others	Total
10/11/2025	25	15	6	0	2	0	19	67
11/11/2025	39	24	4	3	4	0	26	100
12/11/2025	105	53	2	2	1	4	45	212
13/11/2025	82	35	6	0	0	0	29	152
14/11/2025	20	15	0	2	2	0	19	58
15/11/2025	41	21	0	2	4	0	25	93
16/11/2025	38	29	6	4	6	0	29	112
Subtotal 1 (Week 68)	350	192	24	13	19	4	192	794

Date	Food Items	Fruits and Vegetables	Hygiene Materials	Frozen Foods and Eggs	Shelter Materials	Cooking Gas	Others	Total
17/11/2025	105	61	4	3	3	2	38	216
18/11/2025	95	54	2	5	2	4	47	209
19/11/2025	146	101	6	2	0	0	55	310
20/11/2025	88	57	0	3	4	4	65	221
21/11/2025	41	18	5	3	2	0	21	90
22/11/2025	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
23/11/2025	74	37	5	3	0	4	35	158
Subtotal 2 (Week 69)	557	328	22	19	11	14	261	1,212
Total	907	520	46	32	30	18	453	2,006




Figure (5): Distribution of Commercial Trucks by Type of Goods (10-23 Nov, 2025, 2025).

3. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

This section presents a **detailed comparison** of prices for a range of **essential goods**, food and non-food items, in the Gaza Strip during Weeks 68 and 69 (November 10-23, 2025), compared to pre-war levels.

3.1. Food Items:

The following table shows a decline in the prices of **15 items** during Week 69 compared to Week 68, most notably **tomato (-51%)**, **potato (-40%)**, **banana (-39%)**, along with decreases in **cucumber and macaroni (-35%)**, **eggplant (-33%)**, **onions (-32%)**, and **flour (-30%)**. In contrast, prices increased for only **4 items**: **pepper (51%)**, **garlic (14%)**, **frozen veal (6%)**, and **kidney beans (100%)**. Prices of **rice** and **lemon** remained stable with no change. Despite this broad decline, most commodities remain **significantly higher than pre-war levels**, especially **frozen meat and eggs**, reflecting continuing **market distortions** and **volatile supply flows**.

Table (5): Weekly Price Comparison of Food Essential Items (Week 68 vs. Week 69).

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 68		Week 69		% Change (W67 vs. W66)
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Kidney beans	Kg	7	2.57	-63%	5.14	-27%	100%
2	Pepper	Kg	10	9.86	-1%	14.86	49%	51%
3	Garlic	Kg	10	14.00	40%	16.00	60%	14%
4	Frozen veal	Kg	20	58.57	193%	62.14	211%	6%
5	Lemon	Kg	4	7.00	75%	7.00	75%	0%
6	Rice	Kg	8	8.00	0%	8.00	0%	0%
7	Vegetable Oil	Liter	9	8.14	-10%	7.64	-15%	-6%
8	Sugar	Kg	3	4.79	60%	4.14	38%	-13%
9	Frozen chicken wing	Kg	6	42.86	614%	36.43	507%	-15%
10	Frozen chicken	Kg	8	60.71	659%	50.14	527%	-17%
11	Orange	Kg	4	6.29	57%	5.14	29%	-18%
12	Apple	Kg	5	11.43	129%	8.71	74%	-24%
13	Frozen chicken thigh	Kg	5	68.57	1271%	52.14	943%	-24%
14	Flour	Sack (25Kg)	35	82.14	135%	57.14	63%	-30%
15	Onion	Kg	2	4.93	146%	3.36	68%	-32%
16	Eggplant	Kg	2	8.57	329%	5.71	186%	-33%
17	Macaroni	Kg	2.5	5.93	137%	3.86	54%	-35%
18	Cucumber	Kg	2	11.00	450%	7.14	257%	-35%
19	Banana	Kg	2.5	10.57	323%	6.43	157%	-39%
20	Potato	Kg	2	4.64	132%	2.79	39%	-40%
21	Tomato	Kg	2	12.00	500%	5.86	193%	-51%




Figure (6): Weekly Price Comparison of Food Essential Items (Week 68 vs. Week 69).

3.2. Non-Food Items:

The following table shows a clear variation in prices between **Week 68** and **Week 69**, with increases recorded in **three items**: **diesel** by **17%**, **baby milk** by **9%**, and **firewood** by **3%**, while the price of **sanitary towels** remained stable. In contrast, the prices of **four essential items** declined: **baby diapers** by **-6%**, **soap** by **-11%**, **laundry detergent** by **-20%**, and **dishwashing liquid** by **-25%**. Despite these weekly fluctuations, most items remain significantly higher than their **pre-war levels**, with **firewood** showing the highest increase at **900%**, followed by **diesel** at **650%**, **dishwashing liquid** at **117%**, **laundry detergent** at **61%**, **soap** at **40%**, and **baby milk** at **53%**, reflecting the continued rise in living costs and the scarcity of essential goods in the markets.

Table (6): Weekly Price Comparison of Non-Food Essential Items (Week 68 vs. Week 69).

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 68		Week 69		% Change (W69 vs. W68)
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Diesel	Liter	6.00	38.57	543%	45.00	650%	17%
2	Baby Milk	Can (400 gm)	25.00	35.00	40%	38.14	53%	9%
3	firewood	Kg	0.50	4.86	871%	5.00	900%	3%
4	sanitary towels	Pack (10 pcs)	6.00	7.00	17%	7.00	17%	0%
5	Baby diapers	Pack (40 pcs)	29.00	26.43	-9%	24.86	-14%	-6%
6	Soap	Piece	2.50	3.93	57%	3.50	40%	-11%
7	laundry detergent	Kg	8.00	16.14	102%	12.86	61%	-20%
8	Dishwashing liquid	Liter	6.00	17.29	188%	13.00	117%	-25%




Figure (7): Weekly Price Comparison of Non-Food Essential Items (Week 68 vs. Week 69).

4. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

4.1. GCPI – Long Term Trend

In reviewing the evolution of the **basket value** and its **price index**, it is evident that the last two months (**October and November 2025**) show a **notable improvement** compared to the **peak price levels** recorded in mid-2025. In **October**, the basket value reached **599 ILS** in the north and **328 ILS** in the south, corresponding to relatively high index levels of **648%** and **355%** above the baseline. In **November 2025**, when prices became unified between the north and south, the basket value declined to approximately **202 ILS** with an index of **219%**, marking a **clear decrease** compared to the previous month. This decline reflects the beginning of a **gradual reduction in essential commodity prices** and an **improvement in availability**, following several months of sharp increases that peaked between **May and July 2025**.

Table (7): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to November 2025

Month	Basket value (ILS)			index value (%)		
	North	South	unified price	North	South	unified price
Nov-24	1,987.06	782.00	-	2,150%	846%	-
Dec-24	1,251.87	837.60	-	1,354%	906%	-
Jan-25	584.32	395.76	-	632%	428%	-
Feb-25	-	-	156.59	-	-	169%
Mar-25	-	-	385.03	-	-	417%
Apr-25	-	-	775.88	-	-	839%
May-25	-	-	1,857.71	-	-	2,010%
Jun-25	-	-	2,611.37	-	-	2,825%
July-25	-	-	2,766.49	-	-	2,993%
Aug-25	-	-	1,344.21	-	-	1454%
Sep-25	-	-	908.76	-	-	983%
Oct-25	599.46	328.25	-	648%	355%	-
Nov-25	-	-	202.25	-	-	219%

4.2. GCPI – Short Term Fluctuation

The data shows a **consistent and progressive decline** in both the **basket value** and the **index value** over the period from **10 to 23 November 2025**. At the beginning of the period, the basket value stood at **219 ILS** with an index of **237%**, but by the end of the month it had dropped to **137 ILS** and **149%**. The decline becomes sharper starting from **15 November**, where the basket value falls from **214 ILS** to **191 ILS**, continuing downward on an almost daily basis. This sustained decrease indicates a **gradual improvement in market conditions**, a higher availability of food products, and a relative easing in prices after a prolonged period of inflation. The trend overall reflects a **clear downward trajectory**, signalling a return toward more stable and affordable price levels.

Table (8): Daily Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (10- 23 Nov, 2025).

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)	index value (%)
1	10/11/2025	219	237%
2	11/11/2025	221	239%
3	12/11/2025	238	258%
4	13/11/2025	224	242%
5	14/11/2025	228	246%
6	15/11/2025	214	232%
7	16/11/2025	191	206%
8	17/11/2025	183	198%
9	18/11/2025	172	186%
10	19/11/2025	157	170%
11	20/11/2025	156	169%
12	21/11/2025	144	156%
13	22/11/2025	145	157%
14	23/11/2025	137	149%




Figure (8): The value of the basket (10– 23 November , 2025).

5. Cash-out commission:

5.1. Long-term trend:

The following table illustrates the **evolution of cash-out** commission rates from **January** to **November 2025**, where the year began at **17%** in **January** and **18%** in **February**, then gradually **increased to 27% in March, 30% in April, and 32% in May**, reflecting the **increased pressure** on liquidity during a period that also witnessed a **complete halt** of commercial activity. The **commission peaked at 42%** in June and July before gradually **declining to 38% and 36% in August and September**, coinciding with the **resumption** of commercial activity, and then **further dropped to 23% in October and 17% in November**, returning to **early-year levels**, highlighting the impact of commercial activities on significantly reducing the commission as the number of stores accepting **electronic payments** expanded.

Table (9): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – November 2025).

Month	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	July-25	Aug-25	Sep-25	Oct-25	Nov-25
cash out commission (%)	17%	18%	27%	30%	32%	42%	42%	38%	36%	23%	17%




Figure (9): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – November 2025).

5.2. Short-term fluctuation:

The table illustrates the **daily cash-out commission** rates from **10 to 23 November 2025**, where the commission **remained** at **18%** on **10 and 11 November** before beginning to **decline** to **17%** between **12 and 17 November**, then further **dropped** to **15%** between **18 and 20 November**, and slightly **rose** to **16%** between **21 and 23 November**. This **daily fluctuation** reflects the **gradual market adjustment** with the **stabilization** of commercial activity, indicating that the **cost of cash withdrawals** began to decrease gradually in **mid-November** after higher levels in the early days.

Table (10): Daily cash out commission (10- 23 Nov, 2025).

#	Date	cash out commission (%)
1	10/11/2025	18%
2	11/11/2025	18%
3	12/11/2025	17%
4	13/11/2025	17%
5	14/11/2025	17%
6	15/11/2025	17%
7	16/11/2025	17%
8	17/11/2025	17%
9	18/11/2025	15%
10	19/11/2025	15%
11	20/11/2025	15%
12	21/11/2025	16%
13	22/11/2025	16%
14	23/11/2025	16%




Figure (10): Daily cash out commission (10- 23 Nov, 2025).

6. Coordination Mechanism:

During weeks 68 and 69 (10–23 November 2025), the same mechanism remained in place, allowing both **humanitarian aid** and **commercial goods** to enter Gaza. Commercial goods continued to enter according to the mechanism announced by the **Israeli side on 5 August 2025**, which permits a **limited number of local traders (about seven Traders only)** to bring in goods based on **undefined criteria**, without providing details on the exact mechanism or standards. According to the Israeli statement, the goods included limited items of **basic food, baby diapers, fruits and vegetables, and hygiene products**.

The majority of the current flows—both humanitarian and commercial—remained largely **restricted to certain food supplies**, with **strict limitations on all other types of goods**. The phenomenon of **truck looting upon entering Gaza, decreased significantly compared to previous weeks** due to improved field and logistical conditions following the **ceasefire implemented on October 10, 2025**.

Meanwhile, the practice of **commercial extortion**, in the form of **illegal fees paid by private sector traders** to obtain permission for importing goods, **remains prevalent**. Based on available information and testimonies from a representative sample of traders, goods can be classified according to the **value of illegal fees** into three levels:

Table (11): Commercial Goods Entry – Illegal Fee Levels per Truck Load and Associated Items.

Level	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
Amount (USD)	Up to 25,000	Up to 130,000	Up to 3,000,000
Items	Basic food items (rice, sugar, flour, vegetable oil, vegetables, fruits), basic hygiene items (soap, shampoo, laundry detergent, dishwashing liquid, sanitary towels, baby diapers, razors, etc.).	Clothing, shoes, eggs, soft drinks, frozen chicken and meat, eggs.	Smartphones, laptops, solar energy equipment, mineral oils, spare parts, welding machines, water pumps, electric generators, metal sheets.

7. Difficulties:

The private sector in Gaza is currently operating in a highly fragile environment. On one hand, it faces commercial and financial strangulation due to restrictions on crossings and liquidity shortages. On the other hand, it suffers from infrastructure destruction and declining demand. As a result, most economic activities have shifted toward survival at a minimum level rather than growth or development. Below are the main challenges facing the economic sectors in Gaza:

7.1. Restrictions on Goods Entry

- Closure of crossings or allowing only very limited items and quantities that do not meet market needs.
- Focus on some food and relief items, while raw materials and operational/production inputs are banned.
- Heavy reliance on aid instead of normal trade.

7.2. Financial and Liquidity Crisis

- Extremely weak consumer purchasing power due to halted incomes and loss of livelihoods.
- Severe shortage of cash in circulation, with cash-out commissions reaching (16%), thus further weakening purchase power.

7.3. Destruction and Operational Constraints

- Widespread destruction of infrastructure (factories, workshops, shops, warehouses).
- Power outages, fuel shortages, and communication cuts hindering production and distribution.
- Lack of raw materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance and operations.

7.4. Rising Operating Costs and Prices

- Abnormal spikes in the prices of essential goods and fuel.
- Weakened competitiveness due to rising costs alongside declining demand.

7.5. Security Risks and Instability

- Ongoing threats of military operations.
- Difficulties in the movement of people and goods between governorates.
- Inability to plan long-term due to political and security uncertainty.

7.6. Weak Investment Environment

- Absence of incentives or investment protection measures.
- Reluctance of local and international investors to inject new capital.
- Dependence of the private sector on small-scale, basic activities merely to survive.

8. Recommendations:

1. Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies

- Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
- Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
- Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.

2. Energy and Infrastructure

- Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
- Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities**, including **storage and cold storage units**, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
- Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks** to access **all crossings and routes**, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
- Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.

3. Agricultural Recovery

- Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs**—seeds, tools, fertilizers, animal fodder—to support small farmers and **reduce dependence on external supplies**.
- Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations** (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in **trade, industry, and agriculture**.

4. Market Stability and Financial Access

- a. Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring power and internet access.
- b. Find effective, transparent mechanisms to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper prioritization and distribution.
- c. Introduce market control measures to prevent monopolies, regulate pricing, and reduce inflation, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the **worsening humanitarian crisis**, stabilizing **economic conditions**, and supporting **long-term recovery** in Gaza.

9. Conclusion

During the period from **10 to 23 November 2025**, the flow of trucks into the **Gaza Strip** showed **relative stability** amid the ongoing fragile **ceasefire**, with a total of **4,027 trucks** entering, including **2,021 humanitarian aid trucks** and **2,006 commercial trucks**, with only **4 trucks looted**, reflecting a **relative improvement in logistical control**. The **most active crossings** were **Karem Abu Salem** (78% of total trucks), followed by **Kissufim** and **West Erez**, while **Route 96 remained closed**. **Humanitarian aid** was heavily concentrated on **food items**, representing **86% of total trucks**, while contributions from other sectors remained limited, and there was continued heavy reliance on **UN agencies (64%)**, with reduced participation from other international actors. Commercial trucks were also **dominated by food commodities (73%)**, with a **53% increase in Week 69** compared to Week 68, despite **sharp daily fluctuations** ranging from **310 trucks at peak** to **8 trucks at the lowest point**.

Food prices declined significantly for **15 major items**, while only **4 items increased**, yet prices remain **well above pre-war levels**, reflecting **market distortions** and **volatile supply flows**. **Non-food prices** fluctuated between the two weeks, with **record-high increases in firewood (+900%) and diesel (+650%)**, indicating **rising living costs**. **Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)** fell from **237% at the start** to **149% at the end of the period**, with a marked decline starting **15 November**, signaling a **gradual market improvement** and **increased availability of goods**. **Cash-out commissions** decreased from **18% to 15% mid-period**, then rose slightly to **16%**, accompanied by **improved commercial activity**.

The mechanism for commercial goods entry remains **unclear**, subject to ambiguous conditions and **illegal fees** imposed on traders, while the private sector faces **significant challenges**, including restrictions on goods entry, liquidity crises, infrastructure destruction, rising operating costs, security risks, and a weak investment environment. Accordingly, the report **recommends** increasing and diversifying humanitarian aid, enabling private sector import of basic commodities, supporting energy and commercial infrastructure, funding agricultural facilities, promoting digital payments, and regulating markets to prevent monopolies and control prices, all critical to mitigating the humanitarian crisis and restoring long-term **economic stability** in Gaza.