



Gaza Movement of Goods Weekly Report

Week 51: 15 - 21 July, 2025

Week 52: 22-28 July, 2025.

According to reports from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the total number of deaths due to famine in the Gaza Strip has reached **235** as of Wednesday, August 13, 2025, including **106 children**. This huge number is a grave indicator of the worsening humanitarian catastrophe caused by the ongoing blockade and war. This toll comes amid a rapid deterioration in living conditions, a severe decline in the availability of food, fuel, and basic services, and the prevention of relief agencies to meet even the minimum humanitarian needs.

In this Report:

- "Magen Oz Axis" a new corridor that separates the eastern and western parts of Khan Younis.
- A total of 803 trucks entered, of which 774 (96.4%) were looted and only 29 (3.6%) were delivered.
- The looting rate remained extremely high in both weeks, exceeding 95% of all incoming trucks.
- 99% of the total trucks were humanitarian aid, compared to only 1% for trucks carrying commercial goods.
- Prices of basic commodities witnessed unprecedented increases compared to pre-war levels.
- Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI) showing a sharp rise before July 18 followed by a gradual decline.
- Cash-out commission rates ranged between 41% and 47%, with an overall average of about 43.36%.
- No coordination system exists for commercial or private sector imports.

Gaza Movement of Goods Weekly Report

1. Executive Summary:

- This report, of weekly market analysis in Gaza Strip, covers **Week 51** (July 15 – 21, 2025) and **Week 52** (July 22 – 28, 2025), a period marked by continued war on Gaza and a deepening humanitarian crisis.
- Between 15 and 28 July 2025, the Israeli military campaign in Gaza escalated sharply, ushering in **a new wave of forcibly displacement** and further **constricting humanitarian space**.
- The Israeli army also began carving out **a new corridor** that separates the eastern and western parts of Khan Younis Governorate, named the “**Magen Oz Axis**.”
- Between 15 and 28 July 2025, a total of **803 trucks entered**, of which **774** (96.4%) were looted and only **29** (3.6%) were delivered.
- In Week 51 (15–21 July), **116 trucks** arrived (103 looted, 13 delivered), while in Week 52 (22–28 July) **687 trucks** arrived (671 looted, 16 delivered).
- Week 52 (22–28 July 2025) saw a significant surge in truck entries compared to Week 51 (15–21 July), with an **increase of about 492%**. Despite this growth, the looting rate remained **extremely high** in both weeks, exceeding **95%** of all incoming trucks.
- **99%** of the total trucks were **humanitarian aid**, compared to only **1%** for trucks carrying **commercial goods**, just 10 trucks in total, which entered on Friday, 18/07/2025.
- **Karem Abu Salem** (KAS) Crossing accounted for the largest share at **56%** of the total trucks, **Western Erez** Crossing (Zikim) came second with **35%**, and **Route 96 gate** was the least used, with only **9%**.
- During the two-week period, **food supplies** dominated truck entries, with **flour**, **food parcels**, and other **food products** making up over **96% of the total**, while **medical supplies** saw almost no change and **fuel** entries remained minimal at only 5 trucks.
- The aid was heavily focused on **direct consumption**, especially **food parcels** and **flour**, highlighting a purely humanitarian relief approach, with little effort to enhance **self-reliance** or **support critical economic sectors**.
- Prices of basic commodities during weeks 51 and 52 witnessed **unprecedented increases** compared to pre-war levels, in some cases **reaching more than 150 times their normal price** before the war.
- Gaza Consumer Price Index (**GCPI**) peaked on July 18, 2025, at **4,755%** and then dropped July 27 to **2,474%**, showing a **sharp rise** before July 18 followed by a **gradual decline**, with a **difference of about 48%** between the highest and lowest points.
- During the period from 15 to 28 July 2025, cash-out commission rates ranged between **41% and 47%**, with an overall average of about **43.36%**.
- **No coordination system exists** for commercial or private sector imports. As a result, Gaza’s **market continues to collapse**, with major supply and demand distortion.
- The Israeli side continues to prevent the private sector from bringing goods and supplies into Gaza, leading to severe shortages in the markets, record-high prices for basic commodities, and increased pressure on households and consumers to meet their daily needs.

2. Distribution of the Population in the Gaza Strip:

The reporting period from **July 15–25, 2025**, witnessed the continued Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe affecting **nearly 2 million people**. By early July, more than **82% of the territory** had been designated either as **evacuation zones** or **No-go areas**, leaving residents with extremely limited shelter options. Makeshift camps in western Gaza, Deir al-Balah, and Al-Mawasi have exceeded their capacity, lacking basic infrastructure, protection, and sanitation services. The systematic and accelerated demolition of homes and all types of buildings also continued unabated, and it is no longer confined to Rafah Governorate as before. It has now expanded to all areas under Israeli military control, such as **northern Gaza** (Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, Jabalia), **eastern Gaza Governorate** (Shuja'iyya, Zeitoun, Tuffah), **and eastern and central Khan Younis Governorate** (Abasan, Bani Suheila, Abasan, Hayy Al-Amal, Al-Satar Al-Gharbi, and Ma'an). This week, the Israeli army also began carving out **a new corridor** that separates the eastern and western parts of Khan Younis Governorate, named the **"Magen Oz Axis."** The new corridor stretches horizontally for 15 kilometers, starting from **"Morag Axis"** north of Rafah City in the south, and reaching **"Kissufim Gate"** northeast of Al-Qarara town in the south of the Strip, as shown in the map below. The corridor runs through the eastern part of Khan Younis and effectively separates the eastern towns of the governorate from its western parts, contributing to an unprecedented fragmentation of the governorate. It was constructed over the ruins of destroyed residential neighborhoods and bulldozed agricultural lands, as part of an Israeli strategy aimed at dividing Gaza Strip into isolated zones. Observers warn of far-reaching humanitarian consequences of this corridor, especially as it will severely impede the delivery of humanitarian aid and essential services to besieged areas, particularly families who have fled the eastern combat zones toward the west.




Figure (1): Populated and Evacuated Areas, and the Status of Crossings and Roads in Gaza Strip.

3. Daily Crossing Points Status:

3.1. Number of Trucks:

Table (1) shows data on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 15/07/2025 to 28/07/2025, broken down by crossing points and the number of looted or delivered trucks, with totals for each week.

3.1.1. Overview of the period:

- Total trucks entered: **803 trucks**.
- Of these, **774 trucks were looted** (96.4%) and **29 trucks were delivered** (3.6%).

3.1.2. Week 51 (15 – 21 July 2025):

- Total trucks: **116** (103 looted, 13 delivered).
- Highest entry day: Sunday 20/07/2025 with **71 trucks**.
- Most active crossings: **Route 96 Gate** and **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)**, with partial entry through Erez on some days.
- First three days (15–17 July) saw **zero entries**.

3.1.3. Week 52 (22 – 28 July 2025):

- Total trucks: **687** (671 looted, 16 delivered).
- Highest entry day: Monday 28/07/2025 with **133 trucks**.
- Most days recorded high counts (over 90 trucks per day), with notable activity through **Erez and KAS together**.
- Lowest entry day in this week: Thursday 24/07/2025 with **65 trucks**.

3.1.4. General observations:

1. **Significant increase** in truck numbers in Week 52 compared to Week 51 (around 492% growth).
2. **Very high looting rate**, exceeding 95% in both weeks.
3. Multiple crossings operating on the same day (e.g., 20, 27, and 28 July) were associated with higher entry figures.
4. The early days of the period had almost no entries, indicating a temporary suspension of crossings.

Table (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing and Delivery Status (15–28 July 2025).

#	Day	Date	Crossing	Number of Entered Trucks		
				Looted	Delivered	Total
1	Tuesday	15/07/2025	-	0	0	0
2	Wednesday	16/07/2025	-	0	0	0
3	Thursday	17/07/2025	-	0	0	0
4	Friday	18/07/2025	Route 96	7	8	15
5	Saturday	19/07/2025	KAS	10	0	10
6	Sunday	20/07/2025	KAS & Erez & Route 96	66	5	71
7	Monday	21/07/2025	Route 96	20	0	20
Subtotal 1 (Week 51)				103	13	116
8	Tuesday	22/07/2025	Erez & KAS	90	0	90
9	Wednesday	23/07/2025	Erez & KAS	140	0	140
10	Thursday	24/07/2025	KAS	60	5	65
11	Friday	25/07/2025	Erez & KAS	90	0	90
12	Saturday	26/07/2025	Erez & KAS	90	6	96
13	Sunday	27/07/2025	Erez & KAS & Route 96	73	0	73
14	Monday	28/07/2025	Erez & KAS & Route 96	128	5	133
Subtotal 2 (Week 52)				671	16	687
Total				774	29	803




Figure (2): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing and Delivery Status (15–28 July 2025).




Figure (3): Total Number of Incoming Trucks by Crossing Point.

Figure (3) shows the distribution of the total number of trucks that entered the Gaza Strip during the reporting period, by the crossing through which they entered: (KAS) Crossing accounted for the largest share at **56%** of the total trucks, reflecting its status as the main and most frequently used crossing. The Western Erez Crossing (Zikim) came second with **35%**, indicating its important role in truck movement during the period, especially as it is the only crossing through which trucks flow into the northern part of the Gaza Strip. Route 96

gate was the least used, with only **9%**, which may reflect its limited capacity and restrictions imposed on this route. From these data, the following can be observed:

1. The greatest reliance was on (KAS) and Erez, which together accounted for more than **90%** of total truck movement.
2. The low percentage of Route 96 gate indicate that it serves as a complementary or emergency route rather than a primary one.
3. The distribution shows that all crossings were active, but there was a clear disparity in the volume of their use.




Figure (4): Commercial Vs. Humanitarian trucks and Delivered Vs. Looted trucks.

The left part of Figure (4) shows a comparison between humanitarian and commercial trucks that entered the Gaza Strip during the reporting period. The data indicates that **99%** of the total trucks were humanitarian aid, compared to only **1%** for trucks carrying commercial goods, just 10 trucks in total, which entered on Friday, 18/07/2025. This outcome reflects the humanitarian emergency facing the Strip, as entry operations have been focused on urgent food and medical aid, while commercial activity through the crossings remains halted. This situation increases the local market's dependence on relief supplies and limits the availability of goods.

3.2. Types Of Commodities:

This week, the cargo of incoming trucks included Flour, Food Parcels, Food Items, Medical Supplies, and fuel, with a notable dominance of humanitarian aid, reflecting the continued absence of actual commercial activity.

Table (2): Number of Trucks by Commodity Type and Week (July 15–28, 2025)

#	Item	Number of Trucks		
		Week 51	Week 52	Total
1	Flour	65	487	552
2	Food Parcels	31	141	172
3	Food Items	10	43	53
4	Medical Supplies	10	11	21
5	Fuel	0	5	5




Figure (5): Number of Trucks by Type of Commodities.

3.2.1. Quantitative Analysis

Total trucks by category (entire period):

- Flour: 552 trucks (68.7% of total).
- Food parcels: 172 trucks (21.4%).
- Other food items: 53 trucks (6.6%).
- Medical supplies: 21 trucks (2.6%).
- Fuel: 5 trucks (0.6%).

Change between the two weeks:

- Flour: +649% (from 65 to 487 trucks).
- Food parcels: +355% (from 31 to 141 trucks).
- Other food items: +330% (from 10 to 43 trucks).
- Medical supplies: only +10%.
- Fuel: zero in Week 51, and 5 trucks in Week 52.

3.2.2. Qualitative Analysis

- **Dominance of food supplies:** Food items (flour, food parcels, and other food products) accounted for more than 96% of the total trucks, reflecting a focus on meeting basic food needs.
- **Weak entry of medical supplies:** Despite the sharp increase in food supplies, medical quantities remained almost unchanged, indicating limited supply in the health sector despite urgent needs.
- **Limited fuel entry:** Only 5 fuel trucks entered during the two weeks, indicating a continued severe shortage of energy needed to operate hospitals, bakeries, and vital infrastructure.
- **Improvement in entry pace:** The noticeable increase in Week 52 reflects an expansion in crossing openings and enhanced coordination, but remains focused on relief aid rather than developmental or commercial goods.

4. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

Despite the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries on 20 May 2025, the prices of essential goods—including both food and non-food items—remain at historically high levels. This sustained inflation is driven by two primary factors:

- **Severely limited supply:** Aid volumes entering Gaza remain vastly insufficient to meet the needs of nearly two million residents.
- **Widespread diversion:** Looting of humanitarian shipments continues to obstruct last-mile delivery, complicating access for the most vulnerable.

This section presents a systematic analysis of market price trends during the reporting period. It compares **Current prices vs. pre-war benchmarks** and **Current prices vs. previous week's figures**. By contrasting short-term fluctuations with long-term trajectories, the analysis highlights emerging patterns in affordability and access, critical indicators for both operational planning and advocacy.

4.1. Food Items:

Food availability in Gaza's markets has deteriorated sharply, with many essential items now entirely depleted. The remaining goods fall into two main categories:

- **Imported Staples:** Basic commodities including flour, sugar, rice, vegetable oil, macaroni, and kidney beans—typically brought in through border crossings—are now in critically short supply. Prices have skyrocketed, exceeding 45 times their pre-war levels, due to the ongoing blockade and rapid depletion of available stock.
- **Locally Grown Produce:** Vegetables such as tomato, cucumber, potato, eggplant, onion, and pepper are still available but in very limited quantities. Estimates indicate that current production of these crops amounts to only about 8% of pre-war levels. Agricultural production remains severely constrained as a result of the widespread destruction of farmland through bulldozing, shelling, and forced evacuations, compounded by the extreme scarcity and high cost of production inputs.

This report monitors the availability and pricing of 13 key food items, comparing current figures to pre-war levels, and previous week's prices. These comparisons underscore the escalating scarcity and instability of food access as the crisis deepens.

- Prices of basic commodities in Gaza during weeks 51 and 52 witnessed **unprecedented increases** compared to pre-war levels, in some cases **reaching more than 150 times their normal price** before the war.
- For example, the price of **sugar** in week 52 reached **448.57 ILS per kilogram**, an increase of **14,852%** compared to its pre-war price of 3 ILS, up from 11,043% in week 51, reflecting a continued sharp rise in its cost.
- Some vegetables also recorded massive surges, such as **onion**, which rose to **11,329%** in week 51 before dropping to **4,900%** in week 52, and **tomato**, which increased from **3,365%** to **4,472%** between the two weeks.
- Conversely, some commodities saw notable price declines between the two weeks, although they remain far above pre-war levels, such as **flour** (falling from 7,451% to 3,267%) and **rice** (from 1,168% to 766%).
- Overall, these indicators highlight the persistence of the **severe market crisis**, with prices fluctuating sharply up and down, and most commodities remaining **tens to hundreds** of times higher than their normal pre-war levels.

Table (3): Comparison of Basic Commodity Prices Before the War and During Weeks 51 and 52.

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 51 (15-21 July)		Week 52 (22-28 July)		% Of change in Week 52 compared to Week 51
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Sugar	Kg	3.00	334.29	1,1043%	448.57	14,852%	34%
2	Onion	Kg	2.00	228.57	1,1329%	100.00	4,900%	-56%
3	Tomato	Kg	2.00	69.29	3,365%	91.43	4,472%	32%
4	Potato	Kg	2.00	54.29	2,615%	76.43	3,722%	41%
5	Flour	(25Kg)	35.00	2,642.86	7,451%	1,178.57	3,267%	-55%
6	Cucumber	Kg	2.00	67.14	3,257%	62.86	3,043%	-6%
7	Eggplant	Kg	2.00	34.71	1,636%	42.57	2,029%	23%
8	Macaroni	Kg	2.50	80.14	3,106%	52.14	1,986%	-35%
9	Lemon	Kg	4.00	80.00	1,900%	73.57	1,739%	-8%
10	Vegetable Oil	Liter	9.00	80.00	789%	81.43	805%	2%
11	Rice	Kg	8.00	101.43	1,168%	69.29	766%	-32%
12	Pepper	Kg	10.00	49.71	397%	67.43	574%	36%
13	Kidney beans	Kg	7.00	40.71	482%	28.57	308%	-30%
14	Frozen chicken	Kg	8.00	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
15	Garlic	Kg	2.50	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
16	Apple	Kg	5.00	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
17	Banana	Kg	2.50	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA




Figure (6): comparing current prices of basic food items with pre-war prices.

4.2. Non-Food Items:

This section examines the prices of 6 essential non-food items that are currently in high demand. Five of these items are hygiene products—**soap, dishwashing liquid, laundry detergent, baby diapers, and sanitary towels**—while the sixth is **firewood**, which has become a primary substitute for cooking gas. The analysis compares **current prices** with both **pre-war levels** and **prices from the previous week**, highlighting the impact of supply shortages and market instability on these critical goods.

4.2.1. Week 51 (15-21 July):

All listed commodities experienced massive price increases compared to pre-war levels.

- For example, baby diapers rose from 29 ILS to 510 ILS, an increase of 1659%.
- Firewood and soap recorded increases of 1300%, and laundry detergent increased by 1025%.
- Dishwashing liquid rose by 817%, and sanitary towels by 183%.

4.2.2. Week 52 (22-28 July):

Prices remained very high compared to the pre-war period, with some relative stability in most commodities compared to the previous week (Week 51).

- Baby diapers reached 520 ILS (an increase of 1693% compared to pre-war), a slight increase of 2% compared to Week 51.
- The rest of the commodities (firewood, soap, laundry detergent, dishwashing liquid, and sanitary towels) showed no change from Week 51 and remained very high at almost the same levels.

4.2.3. Comparison between Weeks 51 and 52:

- Relative price stability.
- Most commodities showed no significant changes between Weeks 51 and 52, with price differences ranging between 0% and 2%.
- This indicates that the market reached a temporary balance after the sharp increases in previous weeks.
- The only exception was baby diapers, which recorded a slight increase of 2%, indicating continued high demand and ongoing shortage.

Table (4): Comparing current prices of basic non-food items with pre-war prices.

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 51 (15-21 July)		Week 52 (22-28 July)		% Of change in Week 52 compared to Week 51
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Baby diapers	Pack (40 pcs)	29.00	510.00	1659%	520.00	1693%	2%
2	firewood	Kg	0.50	7.00	1300%	7.00	1300%	0%
3	Soap	Piece	2.50	35.00	1300%	35.00	1300%	0%
4	laundry detergent	Kg	8.00	90.00	1025%	90.00	1025%	0%
5	Dishwashing liquid	Liter	6.00	55.00	817%	55.00	817%	0%
6	sanitary towels	Pack (10 pcs)	6.00	17.00	183%	17.00	183%	0%




Figure (7): Comparing current prices of basic non-food items with pre-war prices.

5. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

5.1. GCPI – Long Term Trend

The chart below illustrates the monthly value of the food basket, which includes all the items included in the index. The following key observations can be drawn from the figure:

- The actual value of the food basket **prior to the war** was **92.44 shekels**, which serves as the **baseline for the index (100%)**.
- During the **first three months** (from early November 2024 to the end of January 2025), there were **significant price disparities between the northern and southern areas** of the Gaza Strip, which necessitated calculating the index separately for each region. However, overall, the index showed a **clear downward trend** in both areas during this period, reaching its **lowest point at 164%** in the **third week of February 2025**. This decline coincided with the **midpoint of the ceasefire** that began on January 19, 2025, a period that witnessed a noticeable improvement in the flow of goods into Gaza. At that time, **prices between the north and south converged significantly**, eliminating major regional differences, and from that point onward, the index has been calculated as a **unified value**.
- Since the **last week of February 2025**, the index began to follow an **upward trend**, which **intensified on March 2, 2025**—the day the Israeli side announced a **complete closure** and halted the entry of **all aid, goods, and supplies** into the Gaza Strip
- Despite the resumption of aid deliveries on May 20, 2025, the index continued to rise sharply, recording accelerated increases and eventually reaching its peak value of in Jun 2025.
- The period from June to July 2025 witnessed a **continued rise** in the value of the consumer goods basket and its associated index in the Gaza Strip. The basket value increased from **2,611.37 ILS** in June to **2,798.18 ILS** in July, with the index rising from **2,825%** in June to **3,027%** in July. This indicates ongoing severe inflation and a

worsening economic crisis. This significant and continuous increase reflects market instability in essential goods, representing a clear rise in living costs amid a sharp shortage of consumer goods. Multiple factors contribute to this situation, including restrictions on the entry of materials into the Gaza Strip, supply difficulties, and rising transportation costs. These indicators suggest that households are facing increasing pressure to bear the costs of basic needs, further exacerbating the fragile economic and living conditions, and necessitating urgent interventions to alleviate burdens and improve access to vital commodities.

Table (5): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to July 2025

Month	Basket value (ILS)			index value (%)		
	North	South	unified price	North	South	unified price
Nov-24	1,987.06	782.00	-	2,150%	846%	-
Dec-24	1,251.87	837.60	-	1,354%	906%	-
Jan-25	584.32	395.76	-	632%	428%	-
Feb-25	156.59	156.59	156.59	169%	169%	169%
Mar-25	-	-	385.03	-	-	417%
Apr-25	-	-	775.88	-	-	839%
May-25	-	-	1,857.71	-	-	2,010%
Jun-25	-	-	2,611.37	-	-	2,825%
July-25	-	-	2,798.18	-	-	3,027%




Figure (8): Consumer Basket Value from November 2024 to July 2025.

5.2. GCPI – Short Term Fluctuation

To monitor short-term market dynamics, the table and chart below illustrate the **daily value of basket and its corresponding price index** over the past two weeks (covering both the current and previous reporting periods).

5.2.1. Quantitative Analysis

- **Highest basket value:** Recorded on July 18, 2025, at 4,395.40 ILS, which is the highest value during the reporting period, with a price index reaching 4,755%.
- **Lowest basket value:** Recorded on July 27, 2025, at 2,287 ILS, with an index of 2,474%.
- **Overall trend:** From July 15 to July 18, there was a continuous increase in the basket value and price index, with the value rising from 3,391.70 ILS to 4,395.40 ILS, and the index increasing from 3,669% to 4,755%. After July 18, the basket value gradually declined to reach its lowest point on July 27, followed by a slight increase on July 28.
- **Daily fluctuations:** The changes between days were significant, especially the sharp rise on July 18 and the gradual decline afterward. The difference between the highest and lowest basket values during this period is 2,108.4 ILS, about a 48% difference.

5.2.2. Qualitative Analysis

- **Sharp mid-month increase:** The large spike on July 18 reflects the peak of the price crisis caused by a severe shortage of available goods, preceded by three full days without truck deliveries through the crossings.
- **Gradual decline after the peak:** After July 18, the basket value and price index gradually decreased, resulting from a partial resumption of truck entries through the crossings, still below the daily actual needs but noticeable compared to the days before, and a reduction in demand due to high prices and weakened purchasing power.
- **High volatility:** The large and rapid fluctuations reflect severe instability in the essential goods market, making it difficult for consumers to predict daily living costs.

5.2.3. Summary:

The data reflect a highly volatile market with a sharp price peak in mid-July, followed by a gradual decline in prices. This situation indicates recurring supply crises and economic difficulties directly affecting households' ability to secure basic needs, necessitating continuous monitoring and urgent interventions to stabilize the market and alleviate the burden on citizens.

Table (6): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (15–28 July 2025).

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)	index value (%)
1	15/07/2025	3,391.70	3669%
2	16/07/2025	3,501.15	3787%
3	17/07/2025	3,590.85	3885%
4	18/07/2025	4,395.40	4755%
5	19/07/2025	3,767.00	4075%
6	20/07/2025	3,502.35	3789%

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)	index value (%)
7	21/07/2025	3,200.35	3462%
8	22/07/2025	2,934.50	3174%
9	23/07/2025	2,997.08	3242%
10	24/07/2025	2,434.60	2634%
11	25/07/2025	2,549.05	2758%
12	26/07/2025	2,520.75	2727%
13	27/07/2025	2,287.00	2474%
14	28/07/2025	2,449.15	2649%




Figure (9): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (01–14 July 2025).

6. Cash-out commission:

6.1. Long-term trend:

During the period from January to July 2025, the cash-out commission rate followed a clear upward trend, starting at 17% in January and rising slightly to 18% in February, before witnessing a notable jump in March to 27%, followed by another increase in April to 30%. This upward path continued in May, reaching 32%, and then saw the largest leap in June when the commission hit 42%, a level that remained unchanged until late July. This development over the months reflects mounting pressure on cash liquidity in the market and growing demand for cash amid limited availability, leading the commission rate to nearly double in just six months and reach very high levels.

Table (7): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – July 2025).

Month	From	To	cash out commission (%)
Jan-25	19/01/2025	31/01/2025	17%
Feb-25	01/02/2025	28/02/2025	18%
Mar-25	01/03/2025	31/03/2025	27%
Apr-25	01/04/2025	30/04/2025	30%
May-25	01/05/2025	31/05/2025	32%
Jun-25	01/06/2025	30/06/2025	42%
July-25	01/07/2025	28/07/2025	42%




Figure (10): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – July 2025).

6.2. Short-term fluctuation:

During the period from 15 to 28 July 2025, cash-out commission rates **ranged between 41% and 47%**, with an overall **average of about 43.36%**. The first part of the period, from 15 to 22 July, was marked by relative stability within **a narrow band of 41–42%**, indicating a market that was steady but already operating at high commission levels. **A turning point** came on 23 July, when the rate jumped to 45%, reflecting a rise in demand for cash, and this elevated level persisted for five consecutive days. On 28 July, the commission rate rose again to reach **47%, its highest level in the period**, signaling mounting pressure on cash availability and the potential for further increases if liquidity conditions fail to improve.

Table (8): Daily cash out commission from 15/07/2025 to 28/07/2025.

#	Date	cash out commission
1	15/07/2025	42%
2	16/07/2025	41%
3	17/07/2025	41%
4	18/07/2025	42%
5	19/07/2025	42%
6	20/07/2025	41%
7	21/07/2025	42%
8	22/07/2025	42%
9	23/07/2025	45%
10	24/07/2025	45%
11	25/07/2025	45%
12	26/07/2025	45%
13	27/07/2025	45%
14	28/07/2025	47%




Figure (11): Daily cash out commission from 15/07/2025 to 28/07/2025.

7. Coordination Mechanism:

More than 10 weeks after the formal reopening of Gaza's border crossings, truck movement remains critically low—far below both pre-war volumes and levels recorded during the immediate pre-closure period (before 2 March 2025). Current access is restricted almost exclusively to **humanitarian shipments**, with **no functional coordination mechanism** allowing entry of private sector goods.

While a handful of trucks carrying commercial items—such as basic food products, coffee, nuts, and chocolate—have entered Gaza in recent weeks, these shipments were relabeled as “**humanitarian aid**” and subjected to **extraordinarily high coordination fees**, reportedly reaching **hundreds of thousands of shekels** per load according to local traders. These inflated entry costs have translated directly into **exorbitant market prices**, exacerbating affordability challenges for civilians.

Aid Access and Distribution Breakdown

- Humanitarian deliveries are currently limited to a narrow group of actors: **WFP, WHO, ICRC, WCK, ANERA, and Emirates Red Crescent (Faris Al Shahm Initiative)**.
- The vast majority of aid trucks are **looted on routes**, unable to reach designated warehouses—a consequence of **fixed routes and schedules imposed by Israeli authorities**, which have proven highly insecure.
- Distribution centers overseen by the Israeli military and operated by the American organization “GHF” have **repeatedly failed** to deliver aid to intended recipients.
- These facilities were not only ineffective in reaching beneficiaries, but reports indicate they became **deadly zones**, where hundreds of civilians were killed while attempting to access aid. According to reports from the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, as of the reporting period, **851 people have died** while trying to access assistance, in addition to **more than 5,600 injured**.

This snapshot reflects not just logistical dysfunction but a **crisis of humanitarian integrity**—where costly market distortions, systematic looting, and unsafe aid mechanisms deepen suffering rather than alleviate it.

8. Difficulties:

- **Closure of crossings:** Severely restricting the entry of humanitarian aid and private sector goods, leaving supplies critically low.
- **Insufficient aid deliveries:** Despite claims of resumed shipments on **May 17, 2025**, the total number of trucks have entered up to the date of this report does not exceed **1,549 trucks**, which is less than the number that used to enter in just three days before the war.
- **Market instability:** Shortages and price surges creating extreme economic distress.
- **Economic Challenges:**
 - **Hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity** have significantly worsened due to insufficient supplies and the entry of only very limited quantities of flour and food items. This is further exacerbated by the chaotic distribution mechanisms imposed by the Israeli side, which are often accompanied by disorder and looting.
 - **Cash liquidity crisis:** The commission charged to obtain cash has reached extremely high levels, making it extremely difficult for people to purchase essential goods.

- There is also a **severe shortage of raw materials**, threatening the shutdown of many small businesses that are barely managing to operate at a minimal level under the current conditions.
- **Food and Agricultural Impact:**
 - **Ongoing closure of commercial crossings** driving food shortages and sharp price increases.
 - **Flour scarcity:**
 - **All bakeries shut down** due to lack of supplies.
 - **Price surged more than 22 times pre-war levels.**
 - **Reduced agricultural production** due to water shortages and lack of farming input materials.
 - **Higher reliance on imported goods at inflated costs.**

9. Recommendations:

1. Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies

- a. **Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
- b. **Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
- c. **Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.

2. Energy and Infrastructure

- a. **Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
- b. **Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities**, including **storage and cold storage units**, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
- c. **Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks** to access **all crossings and routes**, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
- d. **Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.

3. Agricultural Recovery

- a. **Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs**—seeds, tools, fertilizers—to support small farmers and **reduce dependence on external supplies.**
- b. **Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations** (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in **trade, industry, and agriculture.**

4. Market Stability and Financial Access

- a. **Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems** among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring **power and internet** access.
- b. **Find effective, transparent mechanisms** to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper **prioritization and distribution.**
- c. **Introduce market control measures to prevent monopolies**, regulate **pricing**, and **reduce inflation**, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the **worsening humanitarian crisis**, stabilizing **economic conditions**, and supporting **long-term recovery** in Gaza.

10. Conclusion

The report covers **weeks 51 and 52** (July 15–28, 2025) in the Gaza Strip, a period characterized by a **severe humanitarian crisis**. During this time, **803 trucks** entered Gaza, but an alarming **96.4% were looted**, with only **29 successfully delivered**. While Week 52 saw a significant **492% increase** in truck entries compared to Week 51, the looting rate remained extremely high. The vast majority of these trucks (**99%**) **were humanitarian aid**, with only a handful of commercial goods entering on a single day. The aid was heavily concentrated on **food supplies**, such as **flour** and **food parcels**, while **medical supplies** and **fuel** remained critically low. The report also highlights a new "**Magen Oz Axis**" corridor that fragments Khan Younis, impeding aid delivery. This dire situation is reflected in the market, where prices for basic commodities have reached **unprecedented levels**, in some cases, **more than 150 times their pre-war cost**. The Gaza Consumer Price Index (**GCPI**) showed **extreme volatility**, peaking on July 18 before a gradual decline, indicating a sharp supply crisis followed by a slight, temporary easing. Additionally, the **cash-out commission** rate averaged **over 43%**, reflecting a **severe cash liquidity crisis**. The report concludes that the lack of a functional **coordination system** for private sector imports, coupled with **systematic looting** and **ineffective distribution**, continues to **deepen the humanitarian suffering** and economic collapse in Gaza Strip.