إتحاد الغرف التجارية الصناعية الزراعية الفلسطينية

Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

Week 58: September 01 – 07, 2025

Week 59: September 08 – 14, 2025

According to reports from the Palestinian Ministry of Health on September 15, the total number of famine death cases **reached 422**, including **145 children.** Regarding aid-related incidents, **2,494 people have been killed** and over **18,135 injured**. This happened either at aid distribution points run by the GHF under Israeli army supervision, or among people waiting for aid trucks near the border crossings in north and south of Gaza Strip.

In this Report:

- A total of 1,874 trucks entered the Gaza Strip: 883 during Week 58 and 991 during Week 59.
- 979 trucks (52%) were looted and only 895 (48%) were delivered.
- Humanitarian aid trucks represented (66%), whereas commercial trucks represented (34%).
- Trucks passed through three crossings: Kissufim (45%), Karem Abu Salem (KAS) (29%), and West Erez (Zikim) (25%).
- Food items dominated truck entries with 1,808 trucks (96%).
- A significant decline in the consumer basket value by (-51%).
- Cash-out commission fluctuated between 30–35%.
- The current mechanism for bringing commercial goods into the Gaza Strip remains unclear and lacks transparency.

September 15, 2025

Gaza Movement of Goods – Weekly Report

1. Executive Summary:

- This report, covers **Week 58** (September 01 – 07, 2025) **and Week 59** (September 08-14, 2025)**,** a period marked by continued war and a humanitarian crisis on Gaza Strip.
- Between September 01-14, 2025, a total of **1,874 trucks entered Gaza Strip**, of which **979** (52%) were looted and only **895** (48%) were delivered.
- In Week 58 (September 01 – 07, 2025), **883 trucks** arrived (502 looted, 381 delivered), while in Week 59 (September 08-14, 2025) **991 trucks** arrived (477 looted, 514 delivered).
- **Humanitarian** aid trucks accounted for the majority **at 1,246 trucks (66%)**, whereas **commercial** trucks through the private sector **totalled 628 (34%).**
- Trucks passed through **three crossings, Kissufim** was the **most active** with a total of **848 trucks (45%)**, followed by **Karem Abu Salem (KAS)** with **550 trucks (29%)**, and **West Erez (Zikim)** with **476 trucks (25%)**, while **Route 96** recorded **no movement (0%)**.
- **food items dominated** truck entries with **1,808 trucks (96%)**, while **medical supplies, fuel, communications equipment, and tents remained extremely limited**, reflecting ongoing restrictions on non-food items that worsen the **health, energy, and shelter crisis**
- Week 59 saw **partial relief in key staples** like potato, onion, tomato, flour, and vegetable oil, yet prices remain **extremely inflated**, especially for tomato (+2,686%) and onion (+2,315%).
- Non-food items remain **severely inflated**, with limited relief in **hygiene products**, while **energy** and **baby supplies** continue to face extreme prices, highlighting persistent **scarcity and crisis**.
- A **significant decline** in the consumer basket, dropping from 1,634 ILS to 802 ILS (-51%), yet prices remain **9–11 times above pre-war levels**, reflecting ongoing **market fragility**.
- **Cash-out commission** fluctuated between **30–35%**, showing brief relief on September 8–9 before rising again.
- The current **mechanism** for bringing commercial goods into the Gaza Strip remains **unclear** and **lacks transparency**, as no **clear criteria** or **timeline** for implementation have been announced, leaving the private sector and markets in a state of **confusion** and **anticipation**.
- The **private sector in Gaza** faces a highly **fragile environment**, grappling with **restricted goods entry**, **liquidity shortages**, **infrastructure destruction**, and **rising costs**, forcing most businesses to operate at minimal survival levels.
- Persistent **security risks**, political uncertainty, and a **weak investment climate** further limit growth and long-term planning.
- Key **recommendations** for Gaza include: increasing **humanitarian aid** and allowing the **private sector** to import essential goods, improving **energy and infrastructure** for storage and transport, supporting **agricultural recovery**, and enhancing **market stability** through e-payments, transparent coordination, and price regulation to mitigate the humanitarian crisis and foster economic recovery.

2. Daily Crossing Points Status:

3.1. Number of Trucks:

Table (1) shows data on truck entries into the Gaza Strip from 01/09/2025 to 14/09/2025, broken down by crossing points, with totals for each week.

3.1.1. Overview of the period:

- Total trucks entered: **1,874 trucks**.
- Of these, **979 trucks were looted** (52%) and **895 trucks were delivered** (48%).
- The daily average number of trucks during the period was **134 trucks**.

3.1.2. Week 58 (September 01-07, 2025):

- Total trucks: **883** (502 looted, 381 delivered).
- Highest entry day: Friday 05/09/2025 with **144 trucks**.
- Lowest entry day: Saturday 06/09/2025 with **103 Trucks**.
- Humanitarian aid accounted for **559 trucks** (63% of total inflows), while commercial goods totalled **324 trucks** (37%).

3.1.3. Week 59 (September 08-14, 2025):

- Total trucks: **991** (477 looted, 514 delivered).
- Highest entry day: Tuesday 09/09/2025 with **212 trucks**.
- Lowest entry day: Saturday 13/09/2025 with **62 trucks**.
- Humanitarian aid accounted for **687 trucks** (69% of total inflows), while commercial goods totalled **304 trucks** (31%).

Table (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (September 01-14, 2025).

#	Day	Date	Number of Entered Trucks				
			KAS	West Erez	Route 96	Kissufim	Total
1	Monday	01/09/2025	52	18	0	65	**135**
2	Tuesday	02/09/2025	30	45	0	55	**130**
3	Wednesday	03/09/2025	44	41	0	32	**117**
4	Thursday	04/09/2025	46	44	0	43	**133**
5	Friday	05/09/2025	39	55	0	50	**144**
6	Saturday	06/09/2025	10	48	0	45	**103**
7	Sunday	07/09/2025	15	35	0	71	**121**
Subtotal 1 (Week 58)			**236**	**286**	**0**	**361**	**883**
8	Monday	08/09/2025	47	25	0	90	**162**
9	Tuesday	09/09/2025	49	55	0	108	**212**
10	Wednesday	10/09/2025	40	52	0	65	**157**
11	Thursday	11/09/2025	58	58	0	82	**198**
12	Friday	12/09/2025	45	0	0	75	**120**
13	Saturday	13/09/2025	30	0	0	32	**62**
14	Sunday	14/09/2025	45	0	0	35	**80**
Subtotal 2 (Week 59)			**314**	**190**	**0**	**487**	**991**
Total			**550**	**476**	**0**	**848**	**1,874**



Figure (1): Truck entries into Gaza Strip by Crossing (September 01-14, 2025)

3.2. (Humanitarian Vs. Commercial) and (Delivered Vs. Looted) trucks:

Out of a total of 1,874 trucks entering Gaza during Weeks 58 and 59, only **895 trucks** (48%) were successfully delivered, while **979 trucks** (52%) were looted. Humanitarian aid trucks accounted for the majority at **1,246 trucks** (66%), whereas commercial trucks through the private sector **totalled 628** (34%). Despite their smaller share, commercial trucks showed relatively **better protection** and contributed to **improving the availability of goods in markets**. The high looting rate among humanitarian trucks highlights the deliberate Israeli policy of preventing the securing and protection of humanitarian aid convoys, while enforcing the chaos of so-called "**self-distribution**" of aid — a **euphemism for looting.**

Table (2): Commercial vs. Humanitarian, Delivery and Looting Status (Weeks 58-59).

Date	Number of Trucks			Delivered Status	
	Commercial	Humanitarian	Total	Looted	Delivered
01/09/2025	39	96	**135**	66	69
02/09/2025	55	75	**130**	75	55
03/09/2025	37	80	**117**	79	38
04/09/2025	43	90	**133**	90	43
05/09/2025	40	104	**144**	94	50
06/09/2025	45	58	**103**	48	55
07/09/2025	65	56	**121**	50	71
Subtotal 1 (Week 58)	**324**	**559**	**883**	**502**	**381**
08/09/2025	70	92	**162**	65	97
09/09/2025	30	182	**212**	97	115
10/09/2025	45	112	**157**	92	65
11/09/2025	52	146	**198**	108	90
12/09/2025	40	80	**120**	45	75
13/09/2025	32	30	**62**	30	32
14/09/2025	35	45	**80**	40	40
Subtotal 1 (Week 59)	**304**	**687**	**991**	**477**	**514**
Total (Week 58 + 59)	**628**	**1246**	**1,874**	**979**	**895**





Figure (2): Humanitarian Vs. Commercial and Delivered Vs. Looted trucks (Week 58-59).

3.3. Types Of Commodities:

During the reporting period, a total of 1,874 trucks entered, with food items of various types (general food items, food parcels, and flour) accounting for the largest share at 1,808 trucks, representing approximately 96% of the total. In contrast, medical supplies and fuel shipments combined did not exceed 60 trucks (3%). Meanwhile, the entry of both Communications Equipment and Tents was very limited, consisting of **4 trucks of telecommunications equipment** and **2 trucks of tents**. This pattern indicates the continued policy of restricting non-food items, which exacerbates the crisis in the sectors of health, energy, and shelter, despite the relative improvement in some items.

Table (3): Number of Trucks by Commodity Type (Week 58-59)

#	Item	Number of Trucks		
		Week 58	Week 59	Total
1	Flour	299	278	**577**
2	Food Parcels	157	268	**425**
3	Food Items	396	410	**806**
4	Medical Supplies	5	15	**20**
5	Fuel	22	18	**40**
6	Communication Equipment	4	0	**4**
7	Tents	0	2	**2**
Total		**907**	**842**	**1,874**



Figure (3): Number of Trucks by Type of Commodities (Week 58-59).



Figure (4): Commodities by types during the reporting period (week 56 -57).

3. Market Prices for Basic Goods:

4.1. Food Items:

The data in the following table shows that while **Week 59** brought partial relief in Gaza's markets, with notable price drops in key staples such as **potato** (from 72 to 26 ILS/Kg, **-65%**), **onion** (from 91 to 48 ILS/Kg, **-47%**), **tomato** (from 103 to 56 ILS/Kg, **-46%**), **flour** (-15%), and **vegetable oil** (-22%), overall levels remain **extremely inflated** compared to pre-war, with increases still exceeding **+2,600% for tomato** and **+2,300% for onion**. Some items like **lemon** (-11%), **garlic** (-8%), **sugar** (-5%), and **rice** (-1%) recorded only slight declines, while

kidney beans stayed stable at 8 NIS (just **+14%** above pre-war). At the same time, **cucumber** (+14%), **eggplant** (+11%), and **pepper** (+3%) continued to rise, reflecting **ongoing scarcity**. This mixed trend highlights that although certain essentials became relatively more affordable, the overall **food crisis persists**, with prices still far beyond the reach of normal **purchasing power**.

Table (4): Weekly Food Price Trends in Gaza: Pre-War vs. Weeks 58 and 59.

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 58		Week 59		% Of change in Week 59 compared to Week 58
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Potato	Kg	2	72.14	3507%	25.57	1179%	-65%
2	Onion	Kg	2	91.43	4472%	48.29	2315%	-47%
3	Tomato	Kg	2	102.86	5043%	55.71	2686%	-46%
4	vegetable Oil	Liter	9	19.86	121%	15.43	71%	-22%
5	Flour	Sack (25Kg)	35	210.71	502%	178.57	410%	-15%
6	Lemon	Kg	4	85.71	2043%	76.67	1817%	-11%
7	Garlic	Kg	10	182	1720%	166.67	1567%	-8%
8	Sugar	Kg	3	13.43	348%	12.71	324%	-5%
9	Rice	Kg	8	13.57	70%	13.43	68%	-1%
10	Kidney beans	Kg	7	8	14%	8	14%	0%
11	Pepper	Kg	10	100	900%	103.33	933%	3%
12	Eggplant	Kg	2	14	600%	15.5	675%	11%
13	Cucumber	Kg	2	27.86	1293%	31.71	1486%	14%
14	Macaroni	Kg	2.5	12.86	414%	14.67	487%	14%
15	Frozen chicken	Kg	8.00	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
16	Apple	Kg	5.00	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
17	Banana	Kg	2.50	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA



Figure (5): Weekly Food Price Trends in Gaza: Pre-War vs. Weeks 56 and 57.

4.2. Non-Food Items:

The table highlights a severe inflationary crisis in **non-food items**, with prices still far above pre-war levels, ranging from **+31% to over +1,500%**. While some relief was seen in personal hygiene products such as soap **(-64%)** and sanitary towels **(-13%)** due to limited commercial inflows, most items remained extremely costly. **Energy supplies** showed no improvement, with diesel fixed at **15 times** pre-war levels and firewood slightly increasing, reflecting continued scarcity. Baby supplies emerged as the most affected, with a sharp surge in diaper prices **(+31%)** and persistent high costs of baby milk. Overall, the data shows only marginal easing in certain items, while critical sectors like energy and childcare remain under severe pressure.

Table (5): Weekly Non-Food Price Trends: Pre-War vs. Weeks 58 and 59.

#	Item	Unit	Pre-war Price	Week 58		Week 59		% Of change in Week 59 compared to Week 58
				Price Average	% Of Change	Price Average	% Of Change	
1	Soap	Piece	2.5	33	1220%	12	380%	**-64%**
2	sanitary towels	Pack (10 pcs)	6	9	50%	7.86	31%	**-13%**
3	Dishwashing liquid	Liter	6	50	733%	50	733%	**0%**
4	laundry detergent	Kg	8	80	900%	80	900%	**0%**
5	Diesel	Liter	6	100	1567%	100	1567%	**0%**
6	firewood	Kg	0.5	7	1300%	7.14	1328%	**2%**
7	Baby Milk	Can (400 gm)	25	40.71	63%	42.14	69%	**4%**
8	Baby diapers	Pack (40 pcs)	29	280	866%	365.71	1161%	**31%**



Figure (6): Weekly Non-Food Price Trends: Pre-War vs. Weeks 58 and 59.

4. Gaza Consumer Price Index (GCPI)

5.1. GCPI – Long Term Trend

Comparing August and September 2025 shows the following:

- **Average basket value:**
  - August: 1,344 NIS.
  - September (up to mid-month): 1,066 NIS.
  - This represents a decline of around **21%** within one month.
- **Index value:**
  - August: **1,454%**.
  - September: **1,140%**.
  - A clear decrease of about **-314 percentage points**.
- **Conclusion:**
  The data indicates that the market witnessed relative relief in September compared to August, with consumer basket value dropping significantly (by about one-fifth), due to the continued inflow of goods and supplies at a steady pace. However, price levels in September remain more than **11 times higher** than pre-war levels, meaning that the **living crisis persists severely** despite the recent decline.

Table (6): Consumer Basket Value and Price Index from November 2024 to September 2025

Month	Basket value (ILS)			index value (%)		
	North	South	unified price	North	South	unified price
Nov-24	1,987.06	782.00	-	2,150%	846%	-
Dec-24	1,251.87	837.60	-	1,354%	906%	-
Jan-25	584.32	395.76	-	632%	428%	-
Feb-25	156.59	156.59	156.59	169%	169%	169%
Mar-25	-	-	385.03	-	-	417%
Apr-25	-	-	775.88	-	-	839%
May-25	-	-	1,857.71	-	-	2,010%
Jun-25	-	-	2,611.37	-	-	2,825%
July-25	-	-	2,766.49	-	-	2,993%
Aug-25	-	-	1,344.21	-	-	1454%
Sep-2025	-	-	1,066	-	-	1140%

5.2. GCPI – Short Term Fluctuation

During the first half of **September 2025**, Gaza witnessed a general **downward trend** in the **consumer basket value** and **index**, with figures falling from **1,634 ILS (1,768%)** at the beginning of the month to **802 ILS (868%)** on September 14, **less than half** the opening level. Three main phases emerged: a **sharp decline** in the first days (-24%), followed by a period of **relative stability** around **1,200 ILS**, and then a **greater relief** as the value dropped **below 800 ILS** for the first time in months. Despite this improvement, **price levels** remain about **9–11 times higher** than **pre-war**, while the slight **rebound** on September 14 reflects the **fragility of the market** and its continued exposure to **supply pressures**.

Table (7): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (September 01-14, 2025).

#	Date	Basket value (ILS)	index value (%)
1	01/09/2025	1,634	1768%
2	02/09/2025	1,505	1628%
3	03/09/2025	1,233	1334%
4	04/09/2025	1,215	1314%
5	05/09/2025	1,217	1316%
6	06/09/2025	1,090	1179%
7	07/09/2025	1,164	1260%
8	08/09/2025	973	1053%
9	09/09/2025	924	999%
10	10/09/2025	852	922%
11	11/09/2025	818	885%
12	12/09/2025	752	813%
13	13/09/2025	739	799%
14	14/09/2025	802	868%



Figure (7): Daily Changes in Consumer Basket Value and Price Index (Aug 19–01 Sep 2025).

5. Cash-out commission:

6.1. Long-term trend:

The following table shows the evolution of **cash-out commission** between January and September 2025. The data indicates that **August** marked the beginning of a downward trend after the rate had remained fixed at record levels (**42%**) in June and July. The improvement continued in **September**, with a further decline.

- **Comparison between August and September 2025:**
  - **August 2025:** Commission stood at **38%**.
  - **September 2025 (up to September 14):** Dropped to **33%**.
  - This represents a decrease of **5 percentage points**, equivalent to a relative decline of **13%**.

Table (8): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – Aug 2025).

Month	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	July-25	Aug-25	Sep-25
cash out commission (%)	17%	18%	27%	30%	32%	42%	42%	38%	33%



Figure (8): Monthly cash out commission rate (January – September 2025).

6.2. Short-term fluctuation:

During the period from **September 1 to 14, 2025**, the daily **cash-out commission** fluctuated within a narrow range of **30% to 35%.** A gradual decline to **30%** was observed on **September 8–9**, before rising again to **35%** on **September 13–14**, indicating **volatility** under **market pressure**. Despite this partial **improvement**, the **commission** remains at very **high levels**, continuing to place **pressure** on **cash assistance recipients** and those relying on **external transfers**.

Table (9): Daily cash out commission (September 01-14, 2025).

#	Date	cash out commission (%)
1	01/09/2025	34%
2	02/09/2025	32%
3	03/09/2025	32%
4	04/09/2025	32%
5	05/09/2025	32%
6	06/09/2025	35%
7	07/09/2025	32%
8	08/09/2025	30%
9	09/09/2025	30%
10	10/09/2025	33%
11	11/09/2025	33%
12	12/09/2025	33%
13	13/09/2025	35%
14	14/09/2025	35%



Figure (9): Daily cash out commission (September 01-14, 2025).

6. Coordination Mechanism:

Weeks **58 and 59 (01–14 September 2025)** continued under the same mechanism, allowing the entry of both humanitarian aid and commercial goods into Gaza. The entry of commercial goods followed the Israeli announcement on **5 August 2025**, which permits a limited number of local traders to bring in goods based on unspecified criteria and security checks. No details were provided regarding the exact mechanism or criteria. According to the Israeli statement, the goods included **basic food items, baby diapers, fruits and vegetables, and hygiene products**. However, most of the current inflows, whether humanitarian or commercial, remain largely restricted to food supplies, with **tight restrictions** still in place on all other types of goods. The phenomenon of **truck looting** upon entry into Gaza also remains widespread, particularly affecting humanitarian aid trucks. This has been facilitated by the Israeli side through the imposition of **fixed schedules and designated routes**, which made the trucks more vulnerable to looting, unlike commercial trucks that usually reach their destinations. These incidents have been euphemistically referred to as **"self-distribution of aid"**, essentially a softened term for looting. As a result, this mechanism has **completely failed to improve food security**.

7. Difficulties:

The private sector in Gaza is currently operating in a highly fragile environment. On one hand, it faces commercial and financial strangulation due to restrictions on crossings and liquidity shortages. On the other hand, it suffers from infrastructure destruction and declining demand. As a result, most economic activities have shifted toward survival at a minimum level rather than growth or development. Below are the main challenges facing the economic sectors in Gaza:

8.1. Restrictions on Goods Entry

- Closure of crossings or allowing only very limited quantities that do not meet market needs.
- Focus on food and relief items, while most raw materials and operational/production inputs are banned.
- Heavy reliance on aid instead of normal trade.

8.2. Financial and Liquidity Crisis

- Severe shortage of cash in circulation, with cash-out commissions reaching unprecedented levels (30–50%).
- Extremely weak consumer purchasing power due to halted incomes and loss of livelihoods.

8.3. Destruction and Operational Constraints

- Widespread destruction of infrastructure (factories, workshops, shops, warehouses).
- Power outages, fuel shortages, and communication cuts hindering production and distribution.
- Lack of raw materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance and operations.

8.4. Rising Operating Costs and Prices

- Abnormal spikes in the prices of essential goods and fuel.
- Weakened competitiveness due to rising costs alongside declining demand.

8.5. Security Risks and Instability

- Ongoing threats of military operations and evacuation orders.
- Difficulties in the movement of people and goods between governorates.
- Inability to plan long-term due to political and security uncertainty.

8.6. Weak Investment Environment

- Absence of incentives or investment protection measures.
- Reluctance of local and international investors to inject new capital.
- Dependence of the private sector on small-scale, basic activities merely to survive.

8. Recommendations:

1. **Humanitarian Aid and Essential Supplies**
   a. **Increase the quantity and variety** of humanitarian aid entering Gaza to address critical nutritional needs.
   b. **Ensure consistent and sufficient aid flows**, as recent deliveries, remain drastically below required levels.
   c. **Allow the private sector to resume imports** of basic commodities, expanding the types and quantities of goods to stabilize market conditions across northern and southern Gaza.
2. **Energy and Infrastructure**
   a. **Enable access to solar energy** to power **cold storage** facilities for dairy products, frozen meats, and vegetables.
   b. **Provide funding to rehabilitate commercial facilities**, including **storage and cold storage units**, ensuring early recovery and market stabilization.
   c. **Allow humanitarian and commercial trucks** to access **all crossings and routes**, reducing transportation costs and improving supply distribution.
   d. **Ensure adequate fuel supplies and truck spare parts** for transportation companies, mitigating unjustified price hikes in commodity markets.
3. **Agricultural Recovery**
   a. **Urgently permit imports of agricultural and livestock production inputs**—seeds, tools, fertilizers—to support small farmers and **reduce dependence on external supplies**.
   b. **Strengthen partnerships between chambers of commerce and humanitarian organizations** (such as Tasdeer, Anera, and WFP) to support recovery in **trade, industry, and agriculture**.
4. **Market Stability and Financial Access**
   a. **Promote electronic wallets and other e-payment systems** among consumers and retailers, allowing businesses to accept digital humanitarian vouchers by restoring **power and internet** access.
   b. **Find effective, transparent mechanisms** to coordinate commodity entry through crossings, ensuring proper **prioritization and distribution**.
   c. **Introduce market control measures** to **prevent monopolies**, regulate **pricing**, and **reduce inflation**, ensuring fair access to essential goods.

These actions are crucial to mitigating the **worsening humanitarian crisis**, stabilizing **economic conditions**, and supporting **long-term recovery** in Gaza.

9. Conclusion

Between **September 01 and 14, 2025**, **Gaza's markets** and **supply chains** remained under severe strain amid ongoing **war**, with a total of **1,874 trucks** entering the Strip, of which **52% were looted** and only **48% successfully delivered**. **Humanitarian aid trucks** accounted for the majority of inflows (**66%**), while **commercial trucks** contributed **34%**, with commercial goods showing noticeable better protection against looting. **Kissufim** was the most active crossing with **848 trucks**, followed by **Karem Abu Salem (550)** and **West Erez (476)**, while **Route 96** remained inactive. **Food items** dominated the cargo, totalling **1,808 trucks (96%)**, whereas **medical supplies**, **fuel**, **communications equipment**, and **tents** were extremely limited, reflecting continued **restrictions** that exacerbate the **health**, **energy**, and **shelter crisis**. **Week 59** brought partial relief in key **staples** such as **potato**, **onion**, **tomato**, **flour**, and **vegetable oil**, yet **prices** remain dramatically higher than **pre-war levels**, especially for **tomato (+2,686%)** and **onion (+2,315%)**. **Non-food items** remained severely inflated, with minor reductions in **soap** and **sanitary products**, while **energy** and **baby supplies** continued to face extreme scarcity. The **consumer basket value** fell from **1,634 ILS to 802 ILS (-51%)** during the first half of September, yet **prices** remain **9–11 times above pre-war levels**, demonstrating ongoing **market fragility**. **Daily cash-out commissions** fluctuated between **30% and 35%**, briefly easing on **September 8–9** before rising again, maintaining pressure on **cash assistance recipients**. The mechanism for **commercial goods entry** remains **opaque**, with unclear criteria and fixed schedules that leave **private traders** and **markets** in a state of uncertainty. The **private sector** continues to operate in a highly **fragile environment**, facing **restrictions on goods**, **liquidity shortages**, **infrastructure damage**, **rising costs**, **security risks**, and a **weak investment climate**, forcing most businesses to survive at **minimal operational levels**. Key **recommendations** include increasing **humanitarian aid**, allowing **private sector imports** of essential **commodities**, enhancing **energy** and **infrastructure support** for **storage** and **transport**, enabling **agricultural recovery** through inputs and **partnerships**, and stabilizing **markets** via **e-payment systems**, coordinated **commodity entry**, and **price regulation**. Implementing these measures is critical to alleviating the **humanitarian crisis**, supporting **economic activity**, and promoting **long-term recovery** in **Gaza**.